Internet censorship in Tunisia

[1] The success of the Tunisian Revolution led to increased freedom of expression in Tunisia, a country previously subject to strict censorship, especially online.

The Tribunal charged that publishing of video clips, the circulation of comments, and articles attempted to destabilize the trust of citizens in the national army, and to spread disorder and chaos in the country.

Resurgence of Internet censorship lead to the resignation of blogger and political activist Slim Amamou from his post as Secretary of State for Youth and Sport on May 23rd.

[8][9] On May 26th, a court order forced the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) to block porn sites on the grounds that they pose a threat to minors and Muslim values.

They contend that the provisional government's generalized and unspecific filtering infringes the principles of Network neutrality and violate promises made by the Tunisian High Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition after the Revolution.

Sleh Edine Kchouk, President of the Tunisian Pirate Party, believes that continuous Internet monitoring and Ben Ali-era practices are still present.

Following Marzouk's announcement to lift Internet censorship, Kchouk notes, “Tunisia has always embraced advanced technologies when it comes to the virtual world, in theory.

But in practice, it’s completely different.”[15] In September, the United Nations appealed to Tunisia to operationalize its freedom of expression and information policies with respect to the media.

[18] In addition to filtering Web content, the government of Tunisia utilized laws, regulations, and surveillance to achieve strict control over the Internet.

For example, journalists were prosecuted by Tunisia's press code, which bans offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government perceives as false news.

[17] In addition to being blocked in Tunisia, many opposition and dissident Web sites and blogs were victims of hacking attempts and in some cases, successful content removal, and shutting down of servers.

Because all fixed-line Internet traffic passed through facilities controlled by ATI, the government was able to load the software onto its servers and filter content consistently across Tunisia's eleven ISPs.

Tunisia purposefully hid the filtering from Internet users by displaying the standard 404 “File Not Found” error message, which gives no hint that the requested site is being blocked.

[17] The prominent video sharing Web sites youtube.com and dailymotion.com were blocked, apparently because Tunisian activists used them to disseminate content critical of the regime's human rights practices.

Also blocked were a few Web sites that criticize the Quran (thequran.com) and Islam (www.islameyat.com), though the small number points to limited filtering of religious content in Tunisia.

[17] Starting in May 2010, the popular Skype VOIP application that is heavily used by Tunisian expats to stay in touch with their families went offline in Tunisia due to ATI's throttling of SIP traffic.

In early 2011 there was increasing evidence that the private e-mail accounts of Tunisian citizens along with login details of their Facebook pages had been targeted by phishing scripts put in place by the government.