In 1971 Colonel Idi Amin seized power in Uganda following a military coup that overthrew President Milton Obote, precipitating a deterioration of relations with neighbouring Tanzania.

[11] He also appealed to his allies, President Gaafar Nimeiry of Sudan and leader Muammar Gaddafi of Libya to intervene and resolve the "potentially explosive" situation, claiming that Tanzanian forces were moving within 4.8 km (3 mi) of Ugandan border towns.

[14] According to Amin's son, Jaffar Remo, rumours of a potential Tanzanian invasion led members of the Ugandan high command to call for a preemptive attack on Tanzania.

[25] Several other Uganda Army officers have offered more mundane explanations for the invasion, according to which isolated conflicts along the border resulted in a spiral of violence that culminated in open warfare.

[27][28] Several Ugandan soldiers who endorsed the bar fight theory disagreed on the confrontation's exact circumstances, but agreed that the incident occurred on 9 October in a Tanzanian establishment.

[30] According to American journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, the bar incident occurred on 22 October, when a drunken Ugandan intelligence officer was shot and killed by Tanzanian soldiers after firing on them.

[33] The New York Times reporter John Darnton pieced together several refugee accounts which suggested that Amin had possibly planned an invasion of Tanzania to purge followers of Adrisi from the military.

[37] Researchers Andrew Mambo and Julian Schofield discounted this theory, noting that the battalions that are said to have mutinied remained relatively loyal to Amin's cause throughout the war, and instead supported the notion that Butabika escalated a dispute at the border into an invasion.

[38] The TPDF had received only very limited intelligence about a possible Ugandan invasion, and was unprepared for this eventuality, as the Tanzanian leadership generally believed that Amin would not consider attacking Tanzania while his own country was affected by political, economic, and military instability.

In early September the Tanzanians reported unusually large numbers of Ugandan patrols near the border—some equipped with armoured personnel carriers—and a high volume of air reconnaissance flights.

[41] The following day West Lake Regional Commissioner Mohamed Kissoky hosted a meeting with government and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, the state political party) officials.

At the same time, Radio Uganda's Kinyankole language broadcasts—which were closely monitored and understood by West Lake residents—severely criticised Nyerere and claimed that Tanzanians wished to fall under Ugandan jurisdiction to escape the former's rule.

[43] Amin also visited Egypt and Libya, requesting military assistance from both countries; Egyptian President Anwar Sadat reportedly offered some equipment, whereas Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi promised soldiers to support Uganda.

Fifteen minutes later he received a radio message from an understrength platoon of 20 TPDF soldiers opposite Mutukula, who reported that they were under attack and exchanging heavy fire with the Uganda Army.

The Ugandan forces were equipped with T-55 and M4A1 Sherman tanks, along with OT-64 SKOT APCs, as well as Alvis Saladin armored cars, and advanced in two columns under the direct command of Butabika and Kisuule respectively.

Realising the veracity of Singano's warnings in light of the action, Tanzanian commanders dispatched a six-strong anti-aircraft team equipped with SA-7 shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles from Tabora to the front.

[58] Commanded by Uganda Army Chief of Staff Yusuf Gowon[26] and equipped with tanks and APCs, the Ugandans only faced ineffectual rifle fire from several dozen members of the Tanzania People's Militia.

[72] Six African leaders condemned the Kagera invasion as Ugandan aggression: Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Seretse Khama of Botswana, Samora Machel of Mozambique, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

[73][74] Though they denounced Uganda's actions, Mengistu and Machel attributed its attack on Tanzania as a Western imperialist machination to disrupt the Frontline States' efforts to stop racism in southern Africa.

TPDF Chief of Staff Major General Tumainiel Kiwelu took command of the troops, and initiated a heavy artillery bombardment of the northern bank, triggering the flight of many Uganda Army soldiers.

[93] That day Amin, sensing that other African states did not support his position and irrationally fearing that the Soviet Union was about give Tanzania new weapons, declared the unconditional withdrawal of all Ugandan troops from Kagera and invited OAU observers to witness it.

On 20 November Tanzanian patrols began exploring the area along the northern bank of the Kagera River, discovering dead civilians and destroyed property left by the Uganda Army.

[118] Fearing the resumption of hostilities in the Kagera Salient,[113] the region's 40,000[119] residents were initially resettled south of the river in camps at Nsheshe, Rugaze, Omubweya, Nyankere, Kyamulaile, Katoro, Kashaba, and Burigi.

[122] Unrest also mounted in the military, as many Ugandan soldiers felt that their commanders had handled the invasion incompetently or had even betrayed them to the Tanzanians, resulting in increasing mistrust among the Uganda Army.

[129] Nyerere originally planned to halt his forces and allow the Ugandan rebels to attack Kampala and overthrow Amin, as he feared that scenes of Tanzanian troops occupying the city would reflect poorly on his country's image abroad.

[85] The British Government supplied Tanzania with several million pounds sterling during the war to ostensibly assist with repairing the damage in Kagera, though likely with the understanding that the money would be used to fund military efforts.

[139] However, the government prohibited civilians from going to Mutukula, Kakunyu, Bugango, Bubale, and Byeju for security reasons, and established more permanent accommodations for those affected in Kyamulaile, Nyankere, Nsheshe, and Burigi.

[138] In 2000, members of Parliament from rural Nkenge and Bukoba constituencies complained that some residents had not returned—due to the continuing presence of unidentified corpses in their homes—or had not achieved a standard of living in parity with that of the pre-war era.

The Minister for Home Affairs responded by saying the government would not offer financial assistance to Kagera residents affected by the war as the conflict had been taxing for all Tanzanians and they were not entitled to special compensation.

[147] Residents of the region later testified that while social services returned, their quality was less than that of the pre-war era, and that the rehabilitation programme focused mostly on government institutions, community centers, and major roads, and did little to support individuals.