[1][2] It is generally accepted by legal scholars that the clause "was originally understood to apply only to physical seizures of property" and was not interpreted as expansively as it is today.
[5] In those cases, the Court "reaffirmed" the diminution in value test originating in Mahon, created the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for exactions, and "held an interim regulation could be considered a temporary taking".
[5] In 1991, the Court further expanded the doctrine with its seminal decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, where it held that a governmental regulation that deprived a land of all value constituted a taking.
[10] A study of inverse condemnation claims filed in federal courts from the years 2000 to 2014 found that most arose out of "alleged physical invasions or direct appropriations of property interests, with most arising out of military airplane flights, flooding, or conversions of railroad lines to recreational trails.
[14] Other legal scholars have noted that the decision departed from prior precedent by not using the Penn Central test to analyze the impact of a government regulation.
[4]: 5 The doctrine of regulatory takings "is a mix of per se rules and balancing tests, with an ample amount of ambiguity thrown in.
"[16] Most cases involving regulatory takings are "evaluated under the multifactor balancing test established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, which requires that a court examine, among other factors, the regulation's economic impact on the property owner, its degree of interference with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the property's character to determine whether a regulation goes far enough to characterize it as a taking.
[20] In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court ruled that an exaction is constitutional if it shares an "essential nexus" with the reasons that would allow rejection of the permit altogether.