Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004),[1] was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified how well-informed a defendant had to be to waive their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

He argued that the judge in the first case had not explained that multiple drunk driving convictions would lead to more severe sentences, so his waiver of counsel had been invalid.

"[1] The assistance of counsel clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally guarantees that defendants have a right to be represented by an attorney during criminal proceedings.

Because having an attorney can make an enormous difference during a trial, the Supreme Court decided in Faretta v. California in 1975 that pro se defendants had to be warned of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

"[6] Although the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet explicitly said what standard to apply for this situation, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that in Brady v. United States, a guilty plea was held constitutionally valid because it was "voluntary," "knowing," and "intelligent" (taking the circumstances into account), and in Patterson v. Illinois it had been held that the importance of the right to counsel varied depending on the stage and circumstances of litigation.

[1] The Court declined to decide on a "formula or script" for plea colloquies, however, because the amount of information necessary for "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" waiver would vary for different defendants and circumstances; the Court noted that "the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding" were all factors.

[1] It also might be counterproductive: In a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one.Ginsburg also noted that Tovar's motion was a collateral attack (meaning that Tovar was attacking a prior ruling because it was relevant to an ongoing case), and as such the burden of proof was on him.