"Some historians (currently criticized) refer to the indigenous people as a "formless and ahistorical mass"[10] because the majority of them lived scattered in valleys with difficult access[11] and with an "archaic" culture based on respect for tradition.

[13] Authors such as Patrick Husson or Carlos Iván Pérez Aguirre, with sympathies to Marxism and making use of Historical Materialism, interpret the rebellion as the manifestation of "alienation" (according to the definition of Henri Favre) among the Huantine rebels, which in the Indians was a product of the ideological restriction that the rural environment generated in their consciousness, causing them not to understand the benefits of Liberalism due to the dominance of the colonial ideology that alienated them (reducing the traditionalist monarchical initiative only to whites, who only they would perceive that type of society as the only possible legitimate system, while they only took advantage of the frustrations of the indigenous people), while the failure of the Republic of Peru among the Huantin peasants was due to the nonexistence of "political parties or progressive organizations that, representing peasant interests, organize these masses and turn them against the subsisting feudal regime in order to fulfill their demands" which would only cause great deficiencies in the class consciousness of the indigenous people and peasants of Huantín to fulfill their role in the dialectical movement of history to "fulfill their demands, especially its right to land, under the leadership of the revolutionary bourgeoisie and, when its historical role has expired, only under the leadership of the proletariat."

Authors such as Heraclio Bonilla argue that these historicist exercises have only caused contemporary intellectuals to lack knowledge of the political worldview of the indigenous peasantry of that time and their tendency towards royalism (a phenomenon also present in the Pastusos, Chilotas or Mapuches), and that the cause of these bad practices is the ideological burden of the official historiography of the Peruvian State (and similar modernist governments) with its attempt to base its legitimacy on the dominance of the Criollo bourgeois class based on a reading of the facts with nationalist and liberal biases (trying to assume a priori that these modern ideologies were present, or were determined to be potentially present, in the popular sectors, and making it a logical impossibility to assume any popular opposition to the modern nation-state project or the sincere defense of Pactism with the Ancient Regime of Spain).

[14] "As is known, traditional national historiography has privileged the examination of this period, and has unanimously maintained that all groups of colonial society, regardless of their ethnic and class affiliation, resolutely supported the Creole leadership.

"Authors such as Cecilia Mendez do not consider that the Huantine rebellion was the expression of a supposed archaic mentality of ignorant indigenous people and religious fanatics who opposed progress, due to their servile and submissive nature to the powerful classes, which prevented them from knowing what was best for them.

for their passivity towards their oppressors; but in reality the Huantine peasants would have managed to act out of their own motivations and with an active role, in which they were not good savages who had been manipulated by their innocent ignorance (being an erroneous popular belief that would have analogies with public opinion about the Uchuraccay Massacre), but rather they were people who were fully aware of what they were doing and sought to defend a political project with solid foundations to predict the progress of their community (since the republican structures of the nascent Peruvian state could not integrate them, but rather In fact, it threatened their status obtained during the Spanish empire, making the defense of the monarchy something that is not something ignorant).

[16] Finally, he would postulate the idea that the Huantine peasants sought the “dissolution of ethnicities” (to abolish the legal differences between the republic of Indians and that of Spaniards), and that deep down they were envisioning a new “subversive” order with liberal tendencies that would become more present decades later.

That is to say, the king was invoked as a symbol of prestige and a source of legitimacy, but the monarchy as a political system was not necessarily professed by the local people (...) there was little defense here of the 'ancient regime'; There was little of the 'naïve monarchism' and redemptive messianism (or of a supposed 'conservative' and 'retrograde' ideology) that some have associated with the monarchist sympathies of peasants and rural populations, in general, in other contexts"However, this position of Cecilia Mendez, doubting the monarchism of the rebellion, would be questioned for being based on academically questionable assumptions (assuming an influence from the impact of the Tupac Amaru II Rebellion or wanting to prove that its consequences involved the Republic of Peru integrate the peasants into a Plebeian Republic) and not fully integrate the Atlantic dimension of the historical context (the political imaginaries in the Spanish empire and Western civilization) with the dynamics of the local or regional history of the area.

[16] "This notion of the importance and relevance of the monarchical imaginary in Peru in the transition from the 18th to the 19th century is equally applicable to the total extension of the Spanish empire, as demonstrated in the now classic works of François-Xavier Guerra and Jaime Rodríguez.

Furthermore , in view of the widespread teleological vision of the revolutionary process in the historiography of the period, it is necessary to emphasize that in no way was independence something certain or predictable at the time, so the commitment to monarchy was something completely logical and coherent for broad sectors of the American population (...) It is here, however, that we see the first tension in Méndez's proposal.

I say this because this rebellion, as well as other cases of popular realism in America during the independence, reveal the vitality of the monarchical imagination among peasants and indigenous people, which is evidence of the symbolic aspect that sustained a power that was articulated through broader contexts.

For this reason, rather than discarding the authenticity of the use of monarchist language in Huanta, its study would be enriched by giving greater attention to the history of monarchical practices as they were constructed over time, in their different social dimensions and cultural expressions (... ) the nineteenth-century nationalist narrative erased or distorted the image of the defenders of the king and the monarchy, condemning them to oblivion, and their ideals—whatever they were—to failure and disappearance.

Even today, when Spanish-American independence is the object of growing interest on the eve of the bicentennial, most works focus exclusively on “protoliberal” processes, spheres and actors (...) And finally, without taking away the merit "to the thematic and analytical proposal, it is ironic that although this work proposes such an interesting alternative as addressing political languages other than the revolutionary one, hegemonic in the historiography of Independence, it ends with an apology for popular liberalism"At the same time, regarding the idea that the Huantine peasants sought the “dissolution of ethnicities”, that is, to establish Equality before the liberal law, based on the presentation of an alliance between both Indian and Spanish estates that was unified in the leadership of Antonio Huachaca, would be questioned by Heraclio Bonilla, for not having been the first time that Spaniards accepted the leadership of an Indian (since a corporate strategy had actually been practiced between the different groups, maintaining their differences despite their common pact), and that this would not have to imply a potential predisposition of the Huantine peasants to legal liberalism.