More hard fighting still followed throughout the Summer of 2007 however, particularly in the rural western River Valley, due largely to its proximity to the Syrian border and the vast network of natural entry points for foreign fighters to enter Iraq, via Syria.

[28][29] On the evening of 28 April 2003, Saddam Hussein's birthday, a crowd of about one hundred men, women, and children staged anti-American protests outside a US military outpost in Fallujah.

[88][89][90] General Conway and his staff initially urged caution, pointing out that the MEF had already developed a more nuanced long-term plan to reestablish control over Fallujah and that using overwhelming force would most likely further destabilize the city.

[101] Led by former Iraqi Sunni elites, such as Jasim Mohammed Habib Saleh and Muhammed Latif, and made up largely of insurgents who had been fighting the Marines, the brigade was supposed to maintain order in the city while allowing the US to withdraw and save face.

[118] Attempting to emulate the perceived success in Fallujah, US commanders in Ramadi responded to the 28 June transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government by pulling most forces back to camps outside the city and focusing on securing a highway that ran through its center.

[89][130] Counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, serving in nearby Khaldiyah, said that his unit knew the local police chief was supporting the insurgency, "but assessed that he had to do so to stay alive.

[4] Prior to November, Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi invited representatives from Ramadi and Fallujah in an attempt to negotiate an end to the fighting, similar to his previous dealings with Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr.

[89] Shortly before the Marine offensive began, Sheikh Harith al-Dhari, leader of the pro-insurgent Association of Muslim Scholars, said that "the Iraqi people view Fallujah as the symbol of their steadfastness, resistance and pride.

[193] By mid-2005 the insurgents had refined their technique, triggering them by remote control, stringing artillery shells or missiles together, using solid foundations to magnify the explosion, and burying them under roadways to inflict maximum damage.

[195] Unless there are people melting inside of Humvees, then it's not a real problem.On 17 February, Brigadier General Dennis Hejlik filed an urgent request with the Marine Corps for 1,200 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, specifically designed to withstand IED attacks, for use in Al Anbar Governorate.

[196] Whistleblower Franz Gayl disagreed, and wrote a report for Congress claiming that the request was shelved because the Marine Corps wanted to use the funds to develop the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, a replacement for the Humvee not scheduled to become operational until 2012.

But while the Iraqis wanted to concentrate on Baghdad's suburban belts where the vehicles were being assembled,[Note 6] MNF–I commander General George Casey concluded the real problem was pro-insurgent foreign fighters coming across the Syrian border.

[80][175][200][211][212] By October, more Americans had been killed in Anbar than anywhere else in Iraq and senior Marines had switched from talk about victory to simply "containing the violence and smuggling at a level that Iraqi forces can someday handle.

Under McMaster's approach, his commanders saturated an area with soldiers until it had been cleared of insurgents, then held it until Iraqi security forces were gradually built to a level where they could assume control.

[Note 8][266][268] Shortly after the meeting, Colonel MacFarland began hearing reports that off-duty Iraqi police operating as the military wing of the Awakening had formed a shadowy vigilante organization called "Thuwar al-Anbar".

[270] Patriquin's brief, called "How to Win in Al Anbar", used stick figures and simple language to convey the message that recruiting tribal militias into the police force was a more effective strategy than using the US military.

Devlin believed that the only way to reestablish control over the province was to deploy an additional division to Anbar, coupled with billions of dollars of aid, or by creating a "sizeable and legally approved paramilitary force".

He added that if he were asked to achieve a wider objective he would need more forces, but that sending more Americans to Anbar would not pacify the province—that the only path to victory was for the Sunnis to accept the Government of Iraq.

[280] Some of the first offensive operations outside of Ramadi also began in late 2006, with the construction of 8-foot (2.4-meter) high dirt berms around several Iraqi cities in western Anbar: Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Barwanah, Rutbah, and Anah.

[281] Prior to Al Majid, a previous battalion commander had observed that his unit lacked the manpower to control both the main roads and towns of the Haditha Triad, that the Iraqi Army was as blind as they were, and that the insurgents were killing anyone who spoke to Coalition forces.

[285] The Iraq Study Group Report, released on 6 December, acknowledged that the Awakening movement had "started to take action", but concluded that "Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent insurgency in favor of the political process" and that the overall situation in Anbar was "deteriorating".

[300] In June, a group of Anbar sheiks meeting in Baghdad's Mansour Hotel was attacked by a suicide bomber, with 13 killed, including Fasal al Gaood, and 27 wounded.

Instead they stumbled into a squad from the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment near Donkey Island, and fought an all-night engagement that resulted in thirteen Americans dead or wounded and half the AQI fighters killed.

These regions fell under the umbrella of Operation Phantom Thunder, an overall offensive throughout Iraq using US and Iraqi divisions on multiple fronts in an attempt to clear the areas surrounding Baghdad.

[315][316][317] In May, General Gaskin began planning to retake the city of Karmah, which sat astride a main supply route between Fallujah and Baghdad and was an important insurgent stronghold.

[335] In December, al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released an interview where he denied that the tribes of Anbar Province were supporting the Americans, praising them as "noble and honorable" and referring to the Awakening as "scum".

Earlier in January, AQI leader Ayyub al-Masri ordered his fighters in Anbar to "get away from the massive indiscriminate killings" and "refocus attacks on American troops, Sunnis cooperating closely with U.S. forces, and Iraq's infrastructure.

[362] In December, a coordinated double suicide bombing outside Ramadi's government compound killed 25 people and severely wounded Governor Qasim Al-Fahdawi, who lost an arm.

"[394] In November 2003, former Iraqi general Abed Hamed Mowhoush died at a detention facility near Al Qaim after US Army interrogators stuffed him inside a sleeping bag and beat him to death.

[408] AQI leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir practically admitted as much in 2008 when he ordered fighters in Anbar to avoid harming Sunnis who were not working closely with coalition forces and "not interfere in social issues".