While the British command still worried about both Turkish and Persian encroachment on the Iraqi territory - as both of these states were considerably more cohesive and with superior armies -, the new focus shifted towards internal security against centrifugal forces menacing to breakdown the country.

[8] The British concluded the Iraqi army was not capable of handling either the Turks or the Persians, with the RAF (supported by the Iraq Levies) shouldering the full responsibility for external defense.

[15] In early April 1941, during World War II, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and members of the anti-British "Golden Square" launched a coup d'état against the current government.

The Golden Square was commanded by the "Four Colonels":[17] Although Iraq was nominally independent, Britain de facto still governed the country, exercising veto over Iraqi foreign and national security policy.

The golpistas were supported by the pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, the German ambassador Fritz Grobba and Arab guerrilla leader Fawzi al-Qawuqji.

[20] A force of 600 Syrian and Iraqi ALA irregulars were sent to defend this key town, which controlled access between the Huleh Valley and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret).

The double envelopment was poorly implemented - lacking infantry-tank coordination - which left the Israelis with the breathing space to redeploy their small force along internal lines and defeat each attack in turn.

Previously, this sector had been held by elements of the ALA that were too weak to pose much of a threat to the Israelis, but the arrival of the powerful Iraqi force led the Arabs to believe they would be able to cut Israel in two.

The Israelis decided to launch a preemptive attack south from Galilee to take Jenin, and possibly Nablus, and cut the Iraqi supply lines across the Jordan River.

The plan called for the Alexandroni Brigade to make a diversionary attack against Tulkarm, while the Golanis would drive south toward Jenin; holding the high ground to the north.

The Golani attack to the north made good progress - despite the Alexandronis failing to execute their feint - and took a series of hills, villages and police posts en route to Nablus.

The next morning the Iraqis brought up fresh forces and counterattacked with a reinforced battalion, with artillery support and inaccurate (albeit helpful) airstrikes, that eventually retook the southwestern hill from the exhausted Israelis.

By the beginning of 1951, British General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces, was keen to upgrade the Iraqi Army as part of a wider effort to defend against a feared Soviet invasion in the event of war.

The Iraqi authorities said during the withdrawal negotiations that a motorised infantry brigade was to be formed, based at the previous RAF Habbaniya, a location that had been occupied by the British Iraq Levies.

As in the 1930s, Qasim based Iraq's claim on the assertion that Kuwait had been a district of the Ottoman province of Basra, unjustly severed by the British from the main body of Iraqi state when it had been created in the 1920s.

Qāsim was assassinated in February 1963, when the Ba'ath Party took power under the leadership of General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr (prime minister) and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (president).

Iraqis also tried to use Soviet military doctrine, but the implementation failed due to the lack of skill of their commanders and the preventive air strikes of the USAF and RAF on communication centers and bunkers.

In late 2008, United States personnel were worried by Prime Minister Maliki's attempt to exert control over the Iraqi Army and police by proliferating regional operations commands.

More than 20 people, including 13 American servicemen, were killed when a suicide bomber wearing an Iraqi military uniform detonated his vest inside a dining tent).

Michael Gordon summarized Barbero's findings as: "..for all the U.S. efforts, Iraq’s special operations forces continued being flown to their targets on American helicopters and relied heavily on U.S. intelligence to plan their missions.

[109] Former U.S. Army analyst Andrew Krepinevich argued that the roughly twelve advisors per Iraqi battalion (approximately 500 troops) was less than half the sufficient amount needed to efficiently implement the combat advisory effort.

The lack of soldiers entering boot camp is forcing Iraqi leaders at all levels to face the dual challenge of manning and training enabler units out of existing manpower.

"[117] The October 2014 Reuters report quoted Lieutenant General Mick Bednarek, Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation, in Iraq from 2013 until July 2014, as estimating that "the army has only five functioning divisions ... whose fighting readiness ranges between 60 and 65 percent."

The U.S. House Armed Services Committee commented in 2007 that "It is important to note that in the initial fielding plan, five army divisions would be tied to the regions from where they were recruited and the other five would be deployable throughout Iraq.

"[120] According to the United States Department of Defense Measuring Safety and Security in Iraq report of August 2006, plans at that time called for the Iraqi Army to be built up to an approximately 137,500-person force.

The training is based on the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst model, chosen in part due to its shorter graduation time compared to West Point.

On May of that same year the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions.

In May 2005, Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72s to the Iraqi Army, with the refurbishment contract going to Defense Solutions to bring the tanks up to operational status for an estimated 4.5 million dollars US.

[135][136] In August 2008, the United States proposed military sales to Iraq, which will include the latest upgraded M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, attack helicopters, Stryker armored vehicles, modern radios, all to be valued at an estimated $2.16 billion.

A 2006 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) notes that out of the 370,000 weapons turned over to the U.S. since the fall of Saddam's regime, only 12,000 serial numbers have been recorded.