Ancient Medieval Modern The Iraqi Kurds (Kurdish: Kurdanî Êraq \ کوردانی عێراق, Arabic: أكراد العراق) are the second largest ethnic group of Iraq.
While the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) proposed Kurdish independence, this was never implemented, and Iraqi Kurds were incorporated into the modern state of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds began to emerge as a distinct subgroup of the Kurdish population following the creation of the modern state of Iraq by Great Britain under the terms of the Sykes–Picot Agreement during World War I.
[16] After the Gulf War and an unsuccessful Kurdish uprising in 1991, Kurds fled back to the mountains to seek refuge from the government forces.
Iraqi Kurdistan built a socioeconomic infrastructure from scratch, completely independent from the centralized framework of Ba'athist Iraq.
Kurds gained territory to the south of Iraqi Kurdistan after the US-led invasion in 2003 to regain what land they considered historically theirs.
[20] Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution vowed to place disputed areas under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) by the end of 2007.
The normalization phase was supposed to undo the 'Arabization' policies Kurds faced from 1968 to 2003 that were designed to alter the demographic in the city of Kirkuk and other disputed areas to favor the Arab population.
There is a significant minority Shia population following the Ja'fari school, called the Feylis who live in the central and eastern parts of Iraq.
Despite that many feylis are secular or moderate, the alienation by their fellow sunni Kurds have pushed them closer to the Shia regime in Iran.
[4] Such as, following Islamic food restrictions, refraining from the consumption of alcohol, circumcising male newborns, and wearing a veil are all very popular customs and rituals among Kurds.
[4] A major weakness of Kurdish national cohesiveness has been the strength of tribal and regional factions, often resulting in strong breaks between political parties.
[17] The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded by Masoud Barzani, leans toward conservative nationalism and has a strong presence in the north.
[17] Fighting again broke out in 1996, the KDP looked for assistance from the central Iraqi government and the PUK sought out support for the United States.
This clash divided the two rival zones into "Barzanistan" and "Talabanistan", establishing two administrations, cabinets, parliaments, and state flags.
[17] Political party infighting ruined a chance for the Kurdish peoples to unify and establish an autonomous state, completely separate from the Iraqi central government.
The PKK has been a major party seeking state autonomy and cultural, linguistic, and ethnic rights for Kurds in Turkey.
[29] Kurdish leaders in Iraq have pushed for the prosperity of divided local governments rather than an independent state; this is because leadership is derived from tribal legitimacy, rather than political institutions.
Turkey has also attacked the political parties PUK and PKK, while keeping good relations with the KDP, partially for access to cheap Iraqi oil.
Throughout the 1990s, when Kurds were given regional control after the Gulf War and a no-fly zone was established, a stronger Kurdish identity began to form.
[17] Previously dependent on the socioeconomic infrastructure of Baghdad, Kurds were able to efficiently build up their region, physically and politically, from scratch.
Nationalism was also hindered by divisions of tribes, languages, and geography that prevented the Kurdish people from identifying completely as one unit.
[18] No leader has yet to rise above this tribal status and the infighting hurts those fighting for Kurdish autonomy because they are divided by other factions or political boundaries.
This access allowed Kurdish language publications, texts, educational programs, and cultural organizations to flourish—benefits that Kurds only were experiencing within the state of Iraq and in European academic institutions.
Since the capture of their leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, Kurds have limited their activism to fighting for cultural, social and educational rights within the state of Turkey.
This is just one instance of how Kurds are focusing on improving their livelihood within already established state lines rather than pushing for a restructuring of political borders in the Middle East.
[30] In September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government headed by Massoud Barzani announced the intention to secede from Iraq by conducting an independence referendum.
Since then, Iraqi Kurdish officials have complained about a perceived return to Baathist Iraq-era Arabization policies in the disputed territories, including oil-rich Kirkuk.
[31] In a leaked letter published by Al-Monitor in September 2023, Masrour Barzani, the prime minister of KRG warned about an imminent collapse of the federal model in Iraq (i.e. a return to centralism) and urged the United States to intervene, saying: "I write to you now at another critical juncture in our history, one that I fear we may have difficulty overcoming.
For the first time in my tenure as prime minister, I hold grave concerns that this dishonorable campaign against us may cause the collapse of … the very model of a Federal Iraq that the United States sponsored in 2003 and purported to stand by since.