It was formed as an umbrella opposition group with the aid and direction of the United States' government following the Persian Gulf War, for the purpose of fomenting the overthrow of longtime Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Then President George H. W. Bush signed a presidential finding directing the Central Intelligence Agency to create conditions for Saddam's removal in May 1991.

The leaders included monarchist Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein that called for the return of a constitutional monarchy for Iraq, moderate Shi'ite Muslim cleric Mohammad Bahr al-Ulloum; ex-Iraqi general Hasan Naqib; and Masoud Barzani.

The rivalries between the Kurdish parties prompted the KDP to seek armed support from Saddam Hussein for its capture of the town of Arbil from rival PUK.

INC was subsequently plagued by dissociation of many of its constituent groups from the INC umbrella, a cutoff of funds from its international backers (including the United States), and continued pressure from Iraqi intelligence services especially after a failed 1995 coup attempt.

However, Hersh added, "A dispute over Chalabi's potential usefulness preoccupies the bureaucracy, as the civilian leadership in The Pentagon continues to insist that only the INC can lead the opposition.

At the same time, a former Administration official told me, 'Everybody but the Pentagon and the office of the Vice President wants to ditch the INC.' INC's critics note that Chalabi, despite years of effort and millions of dollars in American aid, is intensely unpopular today among many elements in Iraq.

'"[6] Notwithstanding these concerns, Hersh reported that "INC supporters in and around the Administration, including Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, believe, like Chalabi, that any show of force would immediately trigger a revolt against Saddam within Iraq, and that it would quickly expand.

Much of the pro-war faction's information came from INC, even though "most Iraq hands with long experience in dealing with that country's tumultuous politics consider the INC's intelligence-gathering abilities to be nearly nil.

At the CIA and at the State Department, Ahmed Chalabi, the INC's leader, is viewed as the ineffectual head of a self-inflated and corrupt organization skilled at lobbying and public relations, but not much else.

[8] In February 2003, as the Bush administration neared the end of its preparations for war, an internal fight erupted over INC's plan to actually become the government of Iraq after the U.S. invasion.