Morgenthau Plan
[7] The original memorandum, written some time between January and early September 1944, signed by Morgenthau, and headed "Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany", is preserved at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum.
[1] According to Morgenthau's son, senior U.S. Treasury Department official and alleged Soviet spy Harry Dexter White was influential in drafting the memorandum.
[14] After his return from Europe, Morgenthau informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he would immediately take care of Germany's affairs with the following words: "I appreciate the fact that this isn't my responsibility, but I'm doing this as an American citizen, and I'm going to continue to do so, and I'm going to stick my nose into it until I know it is all right.
The President showed increased interest in what had been accomplished, but despite all of Morgenthau's hopes, Roosevelt initially did not officially invite him to take part in the drafting of the plans.
[17] Morgenthau's explanations persuaded Roosevelt to write to Hull and Stimson that US occupation policy, which anticipated that "Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium", was excessively lenient.
[22] So it came about that the Cabinet Committee on Germany met with Roosevelt on September 6, 1944, and discussed three different memoranda prepared by the State, War, and Treasury Departments.
The memorandum drafted by Churchill provided for "eliminating the warmaking industries in the Ruhr and the Saar ... looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character".
Ultimately, Roosevelt's motivations for agreeing to Morgenthau's proposal may be attributed to his desire to be on good terms with Joseph Stalin and to a personal conviction that Germany must be treated harshly.
In a 26 August 1944 letter to Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Roosevelt wrote that "There are two schools of thought, those who would be altruistic in regard to the Germans, hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians again and those who would adopt a much 'tougher' attitude.
[30] Some have read into the clause "from whom we had much to ask" that Churchill was bought off, and note a September 15 memo from Roosevelt to Hull stating that "Morgenthau has presented at Quebec, in conjunction with his plan for Germany, a proposal of credits to Britain totalling six and half billion dollars".
[33] Republican presidential candidate Thomas Dewey complained in his campaign that the plan had terrified the Germans into fanatical resistance: "Now they are fighting with the frenzy of despair.
[36] On 11 December 1944, OSS operative William Donovan sent Roosevelt a telegraph message from Bern, warning him of the consequences that the knowledge of the Morgenthau plan had had on German resistance.
[38]Following the negative public reaction to the publishing of the Morgenthau plan, President Roosevelt disowned it, saying "About this pastoral, agricultural Germany, that is just nonsense.
[41] A review in The New York Times on 7 October 1945 felt that the book was important to the survival of the American people and would help prevent World War III.
[42] A review by Orville Prescott on 5 October 1945 in the same newspaper concluded that the whole world would benefit if copies of the book reached the key US decisionmakers responsible for policy about Germany.
In view of the continued poverty and famine in Europe, and with the onset of the Cold War which made it important not to lose all of Germany to the communists, it was apparent by 1947 that a change of policy was required.
After lobbying by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Generals Clay and Marshall, the Truman administration realized that economic recovery in Europe could not go forward without the reconstruction of the German industrial base on which it had previously been dependent.
It took over two months for General Clay to overcome continued resistance to the new directive JCS 1779, but on 10 July 1947 it was approved at a meeting of the SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee).
[63] With the change of occupation policy, most significantly thanks to the currency reform of 1948, Germany eventually made an impressive recovery, later known as the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle").
Also as a consequence of the Potsdam Conference, the occupation forces of all nations were obliged to ensure that German standards of living could not exceed the average level of European neighbors with which it had been at war, France in particular.
[68] Meanwhile in Germany, large parts of the population were starving,[68] at a time when according to a study done by former US President Herbert Hoover the nutritional condition in countries in Western Europe was nearly pre-war normal.
It was not until 1953 that the situation gradually started to improve for Blohm & Voss, thanks in part to repeated pleas by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to the Allied High Commissioners.
[79] Beginning immediately after the German surrender and continuing for the next two years, the US pursued a vigorous program to harvest all technological and scientific know-how as well as all patents in Germany.
[86] Meanwhile, Poland was now in possession of almost a quarter of pre-war German territory, including the important industrial centers in Silesia and the richest coal fields in Europe.
Dobbins remarks that the harsh punitive measures shifted toward reform over time as the US faced the problem of feeding millions of Germans and the Soviet expansion.
[90] Gerhard Schulz [de] mentions that the American military government was, until 1947, operating under JCS 1067, which he describes as "a framework that had its origin in the Morgenthau Plan".
The stern pronouncement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive (JCS 1067) that the United States commander should do nothing to restore the German economy above the minimum level necessary to prevent such disease and unrest as might endanger the occupation forces gave way in July 1945 to an order to stimulate coal production for export delivery to Belgium, the Netherlands, and France [which did not materialize ...].In May 1946, General Clay's stop-order on the dismantling of plants (for reparations) marked the first open recognition of the failure of Potsdam.
[95] Henry Burke Wend refers to JCS 1067, as approved on 14 May 1945, as a compromise document which, "together with Truman's ascension to the presidency [on 12 April 1945], spelled the demise of the Morgenthau Plan".
The hypothesis is based on White's previous pro-Soviet actions such as advocating virtually unlimited Soviet printing of AM-Marks which transferred wealth to East Germany.
[110] The relevant volume of the British official history of the Second World War states that the Morgenthau Plan "exercised little influence upon Allied policy after the Potsdam Conference ... where more realistic views were adopted".
