Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan's political practice had been dominated by statism/nationalism, and in the early 20th century, the middle and lower classes, led by Ikki Kita, who were dissatisfied with the control of national resources by the elder, important ministers, old and new Kazoku, warlords, zaibatsu, and political parties heads since the Meiji Restoration, sought radical reforms and advocated that the representatives of the traditional statism/nationalism be indiscriminately categorized as the culprits of the evils, and that they should be killed one by one to show a break with the traditional statism since the Meiji Restoration.
This rupture was most fully manifested when the Tennō began to be viewed not as a symbol of tradition, but as a symbol of change, and the failed mutiny by ultra-nationalist junior officers in 1936 ultimately led to Japan's full-scale entry into the era of Japanese nationalist military government four years later.
[5] British historian Roger Griffin, called Putin's Russia and World War II-era Japan "emulated fascism in many ways, but was not fascist".
[6] Masao Maruyama, assessed that the Japanese statist/nationalist (国家主義) government model was similar to [European] fascism, but not directly related to state/national-socialism (国家社会主義).
Eventually, Japan entered Japanese nationalism, which is similar to fascism, not a national-socialist state, but 40 years of ultra-nationalism have been a great success.