Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test
[1] It began on October 12, 1969, and consisted of a variety of military moves around the world, including activities by U.S. air and naval forces from the continental U.S. to the North Atlantic and from the Middle East to the Western Pacific.
[2] The readiness test was carried out at the direction of President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, but even the most senior U.S. military leaders were not informed of the purpose of the alert.
While the Soviet government was aware of the U.S.'s secret military activities, Nixon's and Kissinger's efforts did not convince them or have any discernible impact on the peace negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris.
After the January 1966 B-52 crash in Palomares, Spain, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) began to look at alternatives to the continuous airborne alert posture that it had maintained since 1961.
The Show of Force posture would put airborne alert B-52 aircraft in a variety of "orbits," or positions, over the Arctic Circle, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or the Pacific.
"[12] After the Zhenbao Island incident in March 1969, the Soviet Union planned to launch a massive nuclear strike on the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Nixon did not want the war to end his presidency — as it had Lyndon Johnson’s — and believed that it was essential to use threats of massive force to coerce North Vietnam into becoming more cooperative at the Paris Peace Talks.
"[30] From the late winter to the spring and summer of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger made various low-level threats and feints to warn North Vietnam and the Soviet Union of the risk of escalation.
U.S. Navy planners developed a mining plan, code named Duck Hook, which was soon folded into ongoing work at the National Security Council and the Pentagon.
[2][36] While developing plans for military escalation, Kissinger's White House staff considered risky options such as ground incursions into North Vietnam and tactical nuclear weapons use, which did not survive further scrutiny.
[40][41] Top advisers such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shared those concerns, also observing that the U.S. could not point to any “provocative” action by North Vietnam to justify an attack.
[42] As an alternative to the November Option, Nixon chose to signal his anger toward Moscow through the application of the "madman" approach by raising military alert and readiness levels.
While the Pentagon's instructions to top commanders emphasized military measures that would be "discernible" to Moscow, they were "not to be threatening," seemingly to avoid sparking a crisis.
The readiness test involved military operations around the world, including in the continental United States, the Atlantic, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific.
[2] A master list of actions to be taken during the readiness test was developed by the Joint Chiefs after JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler canvassed military commands for suggestions.
Only actions that were most difficult to conceal — like the sudden departure of the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-10) from Rotterdam, leaving 200 baffled sailors behind — received media attention.
Bases received phone calls from people in nearby residential areas curious as to why bomber flights suddenly stopped and then restarted.
"[citation needed] One of the DIA reports, dated October 28, 1969 and bearing Kissinger's initials, has been massively excised, likely because its contents drew from highly secret communications intelligence.
[citation needed] Evidence concerning the Soviet government's awareness of the JCS Readiness Test and its elements, such as the "Giant Lance" SEAGA operation, has yet to surface.
[citation needed] Years later, former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko recalled that "the Americans put forces on alert so often it is hard to know what it meant."
