His participation in the proclamation of Independence on February 27, 1844, marks him as the officer who managed the black battalion that was camped on the left bank of the Ozama River on the eve of the assault on the Puerta del Conde, deciding its adhesion to the movement.

Politicians who accused Juan Pablo Duarte of being a traitor to the country and exiled him, hatched the plot against General José Joaquín Puello, instigated by the French consul, Eustache de Saint Denys, inventing a conspiracy headed by him.

Santana, upon learning of the accusation, decided to punish the person he had previously endorsed as interim Minister of the Interior and Police, making him a prisoner in the home of the President of the Republic, and then relying on article 210 of the Constitution of 1844, brought to trial in December 1847.

Eusebio, perhaps because he was the youngest, was initially quite overshadowed, but after the period of disgrace that followed the execution of his brothers, he associated himself with other sectors, accepted the conservative precepts and reached the rank of field marshal of Spain after the Dominican Restoration War.

According to that agreement, the Dominican State would be placed under the protectorate of France for 10 extendable years, would cede the Samaná Peninsula in perpetuity and would collaborate with the return of Haiti to French rule.

Although the negotiations were carried out discreetly, it was clear to the urban media that the conservatives, who disbelieved in the viability of an independent order, placed expectations on the protection of France, for which they commonly received the label "French-minded."

This was an allusion to the Independent State of Spanish Haiti proclaimed by José Núñez de Cáceres on December 1, 1821, conceived to be part of Gran Colombia, discredited for not having abolished slavery.

It can be asserted that Joaquín was responsible for obtaining the commitment of many members of the 31st and 32nd regiments, composed of Dominicans from the city of Santo Domingo, without whom the overthrow of Haitian rule would not have been possible.

In the weeks prior to the proclamation of independence, a revolutionary center led by Sánchez was established, with the presence of Puello, Manuel Jiménes, Vicente Celestino Duarte and Matías Ramón Mella.

Gabino excelled in these tasks, who received the mission of taking the copy of the January 16 Manifesto to the southern region, in order to obtain cooperation so that the coup could be supported.

In the same order, it was agreed that Puello would be appointed head of the city garrison, with the rank of colonel, the most important military position within the outline of the organization of the independent authority.

This guaranteed communication with the opposite bank of the river, crucial to allow the arrival of reinforcements from Los Llanos and El Seibo, on which expectations were placed to ensure the capitulation of the reduced Haitian garrison.

A problem that Puello had to solve was the resistance of the African Battalion, made up of former slaves from Monte Grande, led by Commander Esteban Pou, whose troops feared that the independent State would reestablish slavery.

When the battalion leaders, Commander Pou and Captain Santiago Basora, made their presentation in the city with many of their men, Puello explained to them that the Dominican Republic guaranteed their freedom, as a pledge of which he put his personal origin.

Duarte immediately raised his voice reproaching these unpatriotic proposals, a prelude to a chain of conflicts that culminated on June 9 with the deposition of the conservative majority of the Junta due to a popular movement whose main instigator was Puello.That day the Central Government Board was reorganized.

[8] The correlation of forces in favor of the Trinitarios began to fade when Santana refused to hand over command to Colonel Esteban Roca, appointed by the Junta to prepare the ground for Sánchez, designated head of the Southern Front.

[9] There is no testimony about the reasons that led Puello to this decision, but it is not safe to assume that he obeyed the conviction that the civil war would be fatal and would open the way to the return of Haitian rule.

It is possible that he received guarantees that the return of the conservatives to the leadership of the Board would not entail ignorance of the social and political regulations favorable to the majority sectors of color.

He acted with caution, in order to avoid bloodshed, and the next day he was proclaimed supreme head of the country, after which he reorganized the Central Government Board, awarding himself its presidency.

In this way, the arrest and subsequent deportation of Duarte and his most conspicuous companions had as a counterpart the integration into the new government of the greatest possible number of former Trinitarios who, like Puello, had distinguished themselves for their radical positions but decided to depose them for the sake of the unity of the country.

[11] As part of this scheme, the secret confrontation between Puello, an intransigent defender of absolute independence, and a clique of conservatives, led by the main ministers, some of whom did not hide their annexationist faith, was evident.

[12] Puello questioned this orientation in ethnic-social matters, thereby ratifying the substance of the convictions that had led him to accept independence, to show solidarity with Duarte and, finally, to join the Santana regime as a lesser evil in those circumstances.

Between August and mid-September 1845, the troops commanded by Puello and Duvergé carried out maneuvers that allowed them to maintain the initiative and prevent the Haitians from crossing the border line.

Puello tried to buy time so that Duvergé's division, stationed in the Santomé savanna, near San Juan, could meet with his; but to stop the enemy advance, he decided the next day to fight alone.

In fact, a quarter of an hour after my arrival the fire broke out, at 8 o'clock in the morning, and the column under my command, flying with the speed of lightning, launched itself at the enemies, mocking their bullets and shrapnel.

In an instant they took possession of the artillery pieces and broke the enemy division: the same execution on the left wing; and after 2 hours of lively combat we defeated the Haitians, leaving in our possession the two pieces of artillery, supplies, war chests, some rifles and the field strewn with innumerable corpses, and as many wounded, there being none of us on our part, but 3 slightly injured.Puello was surely untrue when he stated that there were only three wounded, aware that Santana, for propaganda purposes, would have his part of the battle published in loose sheets.

Garrido adds that the conflict became evident during the visit of the Spanish colonel Pablo Llenas, at the beginning of 1846, when he was put on alert to prevent any attempt to alter the existing political balance.

The second time he showed that military energy was during the reduction of an attempted mutiny of troops on the border, in protest of the difficult living conditions they were going through, and he assumed responsibility for arranging the execution of two officers considered generators of the discomfort.

It is possible that the initial cause of such a turn lay in the unfavorable economic situation, a product of the crisis that was beginning to manifest itself in the economies of Europe, which would later escalate into the Revolutions of 1848.

Due to his position, it was up to Puello to investigate the alleged plot, but he was detained by order of the president, who relied on article 210 of the Constitution, which granted him dictatorial powers, to form a commission in charge of judging the case.