The rebels overpowered regional military command and some key units without a shot being fired, but were offered resistance by Guardia de Asalto, subordinated to the civil governor José María Varela; it was overcome later in the day.

The successful coup in Seville proved of vital importance for the rebels nationwide; the insurgent pocket in south-western Andalusia enabled the shift of the Army of Africa to the peninsula, and then its rapid advance towards Madrid.

First information on military conspiracy in Seville can be traced back to early spring of 1936; it was unfolding since late March, when comandante Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería and five captains set up a committee "contrario al Frente Popular".

[6] At the time PCE workers claimed to have discovered a "fascist plot" at the Tablada airport and alerted provincial authorities, but it is not clear whether the case was indeed related to military conspiracy; there was no follow-up.

[48] Chaotic shootout followed; at one point the Guardia men even attempted to push the military back to the barracks[49] and armored vehicles of the Asaltos fired at Queipo's Gavidia headquarters.

[53] In the afternoon hours the rebel command started to deploy military detachments in key strategic points of access to the city centre; the intention was to prevent a would-be advance of left-wing militias.

[54] Indeed, increasingly militant crowd started to gather around local Casas del Pueblo and Guardia de Assalto stations in popular districts of Macarena (in the north) and Triana (in the south, across the Guadalquivir); party and trade union leaders demanded weapons.

[66] During late morning hours irregular groups, composed mostly of members of right-wing militias and aided by some military, started incursions into the Gran Plaza district, located east to the centre and controlled by revolutionary workers.

In some locations, e.g. in Ecija (some 30,000 inhabitants, 80 km away), Guardia Civil commanders involved in earlier conspiracy declared state of war, deposed the mayor and proceeded to detain left-wing activists.

[82] During early morning hours rebel troops commenced a third attempt to capture Triana; it was preceded by blanket artillery shelling of the district and sniping fire from Paseo de Colón barracks across the river.

[83] Where possible, the tactics consisted of enveloping the enemy in selected quarters and closing in on isolated defenders; in such cases, they had little or no chance to withdraw, escape or hide and if survived combat, they were usually executed on the spot.

Moroccan troops, who arrived earlier by sea at the port of Cádiz,[93] were instantly deployed to quash provincial resistance, e.g. Carmona was taken by a company of regulares;[94] at this point a shaky connection between Sevilla and Córdoba has been established.

Alcalá de Guadaira (20,000 inhabitants), a large suburban municipality only 15 km from the Giralda, was also overrun by Queipo troops, removing the only major pocket of resistance in immediate vicinity of Seville.

[96] The revolutionary defenders were as poorly armed as these from Triana; their informal leader was Andrés Palatín Ustriz, president of Junta Revolucionaria and in private the manager of Hospicio de San Luis.

The regulares suffered greatest losses in the triangle calle San Luis-Plaza de Pumarejo-calle Santa Maria,[100] while the Foreign Legion soldiers were reported to have used women as human shields.

They failed in the east, where following a brief stalemate Málaga was firmly seized by the Republicans, but were largely successful in the west, where the loyalist-held provincial capital of Huelva was captured on 27 July;[107] the rebel territory now stretched to the friendly Portuguese frontier.

Like the entire Nationalist terror elsewhere, in historiography it is interpreted in conflicting terms as a sweeping and organised genocide, selective operation against some social groups, overdone policing action basically intended to target specific individuals, wild sanguinary frenzy which went out of control, means of intimidating the population in seized and Republican territory, and others.

[110] The organised campaign of repression commenced with nomination of Manuel Díaz Criado as delegado de Orden Público in early August; in November 1936 at this post he was replaced by Santiago Garrigós.

[113] In late 1938 the official document, prepared by provincial authorities for Jefatura Nacional de Seguridad, declared 7,983 people executed in the province up to date, but historians come out with the figure of 11,087 for the entire war; localities with the highest numbers were Seville (1,700), Constantina (990), Lora del Río (615), Arahal (420), Utrera (416), Carmona (381), Lebrija (361), and Villanueva Minas (307).

His harrangues focused on negative points of reference, like Bolshevism, criminal chaos, breakdown of order or sedition; the positive ones were patriotism, rule of law, hard work etc., all embodied in "movimiento salvador de España".

When building the propaganda narrative about his coup he focused – apart from himself – on the military, and did his best to marginalise or ignore the Falange and the Carlists, even though both organizations were allowed to send armed patrols across the streets, operate own structures and publish own press.

Though the territory controlled by insurgents in the south was a small isolated pocket compared to large part of the country seized in the north, Seville – ranked 4. in Spain in terms of population - was the largest urban center taken.

The Seville coup elevated him amongst most outstanding figures of the insurgency; Sanjurjo perished in an air crash, Villegas, Goded and Fanjul were captured by the loyalists, Saliquet remained far from energetic, while the authority of Mola was seriously damaged when rebel troops in the north got stuck and were facing severe problems due to ammunition shortages.

[125] Eduardo Álvarez Rementería, key conspirator and during the coup in informal rebel general staff, held various provincial high military and civil administration posts and was procurador in the Francoist Cortes; he died in 1965.

Antonio Castejón Espinosa, the Foreign Legion major who led assaults on Triana, Macarena and San Julián, rose to teniente general and died in 1969, as gobernador civil of the Balearic Islands.

Saturnino Barneto Atienza, a PCE leader who tried to convince Varela to hand out weapons to the militias, managed to escape from the civil government building, made it to the Republican zone, left Spain in 1939 and perished in Moscow in 1940.

Manuel Allanegui Lusarreta, an officer less than enthusiastic about the Republic[129] and commander of the infantry regiment, who surprised by Queipo stuck to military discipline and refused to join the unfolding coup, was sentenced, imprisoned and then released; he died in Sevilla in 1958.

[133] However, both Franco-centred and Queipo-centred visions coincided in their claims that Seville was a dangerous hotbed of marxist revolutionaries and the coup prevented the city from falling into hands of the red homegrown bolsheviks.

[135] In academic historiography it is often maintained that the coup in Seville succeeded largely thanks to Queipo, having been "combinación entre audacia y bluff",[136] "audaz golpe de mano"[137] and "the greatest initial achievement by any of the rebel leaders".

[138] In terms of importance for the rebels, it was "revolt’s most crucial and audacious single operation";[139] first because it produced seizure of a radical left-wing stronghold, very much an Anarchist fortress, and second because it resulted in control of the strategic spot on the map of Spain, which in turn enabled bringing the Army of Africa to the peninsula and then advance across Extremadura and New Castile towards Madrid.