From the very beginnings of the Luftwaffe in 1933, General Walther Wever, the chief of staff, realised the importance that strategic bombing would play in any future conflict.

His successors – Albert Kesselring, Ernst Udet, and Hans Jeschonnek – favoured smaller, tactical aircraft, since they could be used to support army operations; they also did not require as much material and manpower.

They were proponents of the dive bomber (Ju 87 Stuka) and the doctrine of close support and destruction of the opposing air forces on the battle-ground rather than through attacking enemy industry.

Kesselring and Jeschonnek had suggested to Göring that it would be better to drop heavy bomber projects due to material shortages.

While these beliefs seemed validated by Germany's early successes in the Blitzkrieg, the lack of strategic bombing capability severely hampered the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain and Operation Barbarossa.

During testing, Luft Hansa expressed an interest in an airliner to be developed from the type, which led Junkers to rebuild the incomplete third prototype as the Ju 90.