It means that if legal redress or equitable relief to an injured party is available, but is not forthcoming in a timely fashion, it is effectively the same as having no remedy at all.
The phrase has become a rallying cry for legal reformers who view courts, tribunals, judges, arbitrators, administrative law judges, commissions[A] or governments as acting too slowly in resolving legal issues — either because the case is too complex, the existing system is too complex or overburdened, or because the issue or party in question lacks political favour.
Statutes and court rules have tried to control the tendency; and judges may be subject to oversight and even discipline for persistent failures to decide matters timely, or accurately report their backlog.
"[13]Lack of a speedy and effective resolution (amidst a bewildering multiplicity of statutes and forums with overlapping jurisdiction) can cause unwarranted delay.
It has been observed that it creates a sense of frustration and unfairness, and a feeling of a lack of efficacy, which adversely affects employee morale and labor relations in the federal sector.
[14] "Delays in the law are hateful" – In diem vivere in lege sunt detestabilis – is a Latin legal maxim.
Alternative dispute resolution, case management systems, and trial and motion practice are all integral to such determinations.
"(1) A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in, the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
"[19] As a commentator for the American Judicature Society noted:"Unjustifiable delay in court proceedings, particularly in deciding cases, can have a significant impact on the parties and reflects adversely on the judicial system.
Commentary to the 1990 model code reminds judges that "in disposing of matters promptly, efficiently and fairly, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard," while a comment to the 2007 model code cautions that "the duty to hear all proceedings with patience and courtesy is not inconsistent with the duty imposed .
[21] Conversely, "[D]epriving quick and certain justice to the litigants ... reinforces the negative images of the judicial system...."[22] A long list of potential excuses for extended decisional slow motion are disallowed.
[F] Passed in 1990, the United States Code, Title 28, §476(a)(3) has a "novel process of making public the names of judges" who let cases go too long without decisions or judgment.
The Province of Quebec, Canada, has a flat statutory statement mandating six months as a requirement for ordinary civil actions.
[9] In Louisiana there exist overlapping statutes and court rules, which require that cases be decided within 30 days of submission.
[26] In some states, court rules have been adopted requiring that delays in making decisions or completing cases must be reported.
It requires the judge to file a certified statement with the court administrator specifying the case, the matters taken under advisement, the reasons for the delay, and the estimated time of arrival for the cure to the problem.
"[30] Efficiency in the making of judicial decisions — and the avoidance of undue hesitancy while maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the decision-making process — implicates law and ethics.
[G] As was written by Justice William O. Douglas in Parker v Ellis dissenting opinion and citing Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 26 L.Ed.
369, 103 U.S. at pages 64–6: "But the principle is deep in our jurisprudence and was stated long ago in Mitchell v. Overman ... "'(T)he rule established by the general concurrence of the American and English courts is, that where the delay in rendering a judgment or a decree arises from the act of the court, that is, where the delay has been caused either for its convenience, or by the multiplicity or press of business, either the intricacy of the questions involved, or of any other cause not attributable to the laches of the parties, the judgment or the decree may be entered retrospectively, as of a time when it should or might have been entered up.
In such cases, upon the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which has been well said to be founded in right and good sense, and to afford a safe and certain guide for the administration of justice,-it is the duty of the court to see that the parties shall not suffer by the delay.
A nunc pro tunc order should be granted or refused, as justice may require in view of the circumstances of the particular case.'
In Bleak House, Charles Dickens wrote about extraordinarily protracted proceedings in the Victorian English Court of Chancery.
There is another well-known suit in Chancery, not yet decided, which was commenced before the close of the last century and in which more than double the amount of seventy thousand pounds has been swallowed up in costs.Based on an 1853 letter of Dickens,[37] the first of these cases has been identified[38][39] as the dispute over the will of Charles Day, a boot blacking manufacturer who died in 1836.