Kazakhs in China
[4] Kazakhs that moved to China fought for the Soviet Communist-backed Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion (1944–1949).
[7] In the early stages, this meant high spending on infrastructure and education, aiming to boost agricultural output and literacy respectively.
[7] The arrival of the Cultural Revolution saw the end of permissiveness and the beginning of a more hardline policy, as Kazakh party cadres were purged, Islamic practice restricted, and pastoralist herds collectivized.
The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.
[10] This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.
The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.
[14] The Chinese surveillance apparatus employs extensive data collection and advanced artificial intelligence to create a more agile version of authoritarian governance, enabling it to exert unparalleled social control.
[19] However, anti-terrorism and social stability policies have limited Kazakhs' freedom to express religious beliefs and participate in cultural practices.
[22] With no strict guidelines for assessing 'transgressions,' local authorities are given discretion in interpreting and enforcing rules, solidifying Beijing's 'preventative approach' towards separatist activism.
[26] Surveillance checkpoints requiring ID and biometric scans further limit freedom of movement, affecting access to work, education, and family connections.
[26] Grassroots movements advocating anti-Chinese sentiment are not an unfamiliar phenomenon in Kazakhstan [29] Despite heavy Chinese investment into the relationship between Kazakhstan and China through the establishment of several Confucius institutes - non-profit organisations promoting Chinese language and culture - and a range of student exchange programs, the catalogue of anti-Chinese grievances appears to have expanded significantly since the 1990s [29] These grievances have only expanded further following the detention of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang.
[29] Kazakhstan, the initial stage of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has cemented its relations with China over the past decade through various energy and infrastructure projects, enlarging its Gross Domestic Product by 6.5 percent [32] The reduction of trade tariffs along BRI corridors is projected to add another fifteen percent to this figure.
[33] Despite this, the Kazakh government has not publicly condemned nor acted against Beijing's policy in Xinjiang, and sixty-nine of China's political and economic partners have co-sponsored a statement urging for the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner to consider events in Xinjiang “China's internal affairs,” and further “opposing the politicization of human rights” [35] However, the wider global response has been remarkably different.
[36] However, in a recent victory for China, the United Nations Human Rights Council has voted down a motion to debate and investigate Beijing's actions in Xinjiang.
[37] Thus, the record is highly mixed on how China's policy in Xinjiang has impacted its relationship with Kazakhstan, Central Asia and its position on the global stage more broadly.
