At the south end north facing on and off ramps connected to Whiteman Street, and the running lanes from the viaduct descend to ground level, with tram route 58 emerging from City Road to the median strip.

[1] In the 1990s, the development of Crown Casino closed Yarra Bank Road, and the bridge ramps were connected to the basement carpark of the complex.

[2][3] The south end of the bridge has been undergoing differential settlement between the approach ramps resting on fill, and the suspended section supported by bored piles.

[4][5] The Country Roads Board (later VicRoads), under instructions from the government, prepared specifications in 1956 for a bridge to cross the Yarra River.

[9] The passing of the King-street Bridge Act 1957[8] through the Parliament of Victoria on 18 December 1957, granted formal permission for the bridge to be built, gave the Country Roads Board powers to take ownership of relevant lands and not to inhibit the operations of the Port Melbourne and St Kilda railway lines during construction, declared the road a "public highway" once completed, and apportioned the total cost of to be borne as follows: 65% by the Victorian government, 30% by the City of Melbourne, and 5% by the City of South Melbourne.

[8] The King Street Bridge was designed in 1959 by Hardcastle & Richards, consulting engineers for Utah Australia, on behalf of the Country Roads Board, and constructed over the next two years.

Included in the CRB tender documents were comprehensive specifications for fabrication in high tensile steel to be read in conjunction with and additional to those of BS 968 -1941.

H&R placed the transverse welded ends of cover plates of tension flanges in regions of low stress as permitted by the specifications.

The greatest oversight appeared to be the lack of, or insufficient, preheat around the weld area to limit the intensity of residual stresses in the heat affected zone.

(On the other hand, it appears unlikely that preheating could be consistently applied, and that difficulties in application could have resulted in variations in the properties of the steel, including strength loss and stress inconsistencies over the affected or nearby areas – possibly causing similar or other types of failure, such as long-term fatigue).

During final inspection of girders, under significant pressure of time and very unsatisfactory circumstances, it was likely that the cracks which eventually caused the bridge to fail were missed.

As J&W were responsible for all plate tests, for which they were not particularly convinced were necessary, there was a great deal of bickering between CRB inspectors and J&W shop staff.