1942 1943 1944 The Kingisepp–Gdov offensive was a campaign between the Soviet Leningrad Front and the German 18th Army fought for the eastern coast of Lake Peipus and the western banks of the Narva River from 1 February till 1 March 1944.

Forward units of the 2nd Shock Army crossed the river and established several bridgeheads on the west bank, to the north and south of the town of Narva on 2 February.

At the same time, the Soviet 108th Rifle Corps landed its units across Lake Peipus in Piirissaar Island 120 kilometres south of Narva and established a bridgehead in Meerapalu.

A simultaneous Soviet amphibious assault was conducted, as the 517 strong 260th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade landed at the coastal borough of Mereküla behind the Sponheimer Group lines.

As the result of the campaign, the Soviet forces seized control of most of the eastern coast of Lake Peipus and established a number of bridgeheads on the western bank of the Narva River.

The Nederland Brigade, the I.Battalion, SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Regiment 24 Danmark and the German artillery inflicted heavy casualties on the Red Army, who failed to reach their operational goal of destroying the bridgehead.

[4] In the Krivasoo Swamp 10 km (6.2 mi) south of Narva, the Soviet 1078th Regiment and the ski battalion of the 314th Rifle Division crossed the river under a heavy German air and artillery attack in four hours.

[4] The renewed Soviet units captured the railway crossing near Auvere Station on 6 February, losing it on the same day under the fire of the German coastal artillery.

[7][8] Two Soviet platoons of the 147th Rifle Regiment volunteered to cross the river to the boroughs of Omuti, Permisküla and Gorodenka 40 km (25 mi) south of Narva on 2 February.

[8] In their report on 8 February, the War Council of the Leningrad Front saw the preparations for the landings across the Narva River as unsatisfactory:[4]The reconnaissance is unorganized in the army; in the corps and the divisions, there is a lack of a concrete decision on the order of battle and the line-out of batteries; entirely unsolved is the matter of the tanks crossing the river and conducting combat on the left bank; there are no schemes prepared of the engineering support for the attacks.

The army (...) lacks an anti-air defence plan; (...)The Soviet 98th and the 131st Armoured Divisions established a bridgehead on the west bank near the borough of Siivertsi further north from Narva on 12 February.

Half a kilometre west of Auvere Station, the 191st Guard Rifle Regiment cut through the railway 2 km (1.2 mi) from Narva–Tallinn Highway, which was the last way out for the Sponheimer Group but was repelled by the 170th Infantry Division and the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion.

The arrival of the I.Battalion, 1st Estonian Regiment at Tartu coincided with the prepared landing operation by the left flank of the Leningrad Front to the west coast of Lake Peipus, 120 km (75 mi) south of Narva.

The 374th Soviet Rifle Regiment crossed Lake Peipus on 14 February, seized the coastal village of Meerapalu in a surprise attack, and formed a bridgehead.

[8] To break the last resistance simultaneously with the Meerapalu Landing Operation, Govorov ordered the 260th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade to prepare for an amphibious attack to the German rear in Narva.

While the 8th Army artillery placed near Auvere failed to begin their attack at the agreed time,[16] in seven and a half hours of fierce fighting, the Soviet beachhead was annihilated.