During the 11th century, decades of peace and neglect had reduced the old thematic forces, and the military and political anarchy following the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 had destroyed the professional Imperial Tagmata, the core of the Byzantine army.

[6][7] Yet, through a combination of improved finances, skill, determination, and years of campaigning, Alexios, John, and Manuel Komnenos managed to restore the power of the Byzantine Empire, constructing a new army in the process.

Alongside troops raised and paid for directly by the state the Komnenian army included the armed followers of members of the wider imperial family, its extensive connections, and the provincial aristocracy (dynatoi).

[21][22] The Byzantine army of the Komnenian era was recruited and maintained by disparate means, ranging from regular payment from the state treasury, through tax-farming, reliance on the familial obligations of aristocrats, who fielded their armed retainers, to forcible impressment, especially of defeated enemies.

[23] The financial state of the Empire improved throughout the Komnenian period; while Alexios I in the early part of his reign was reduced to producing coin from church gold and silver plate, his successors were able to spend very great sums on the army.

Despite a number of instances of the ad hoc hiring of bands of foreign troops and over-reliance on his kinsmen and other magnates to fill out the ranks of his armies, regular recruitment based on salaries, annual payments and bounties remained the preferred method of supporting soldiers.

There is almost no evidence of rates of pay for Komnenian soldiery, however, the same principles undoubtedly still operated, and a Frankish knightly heavy cavalryman was most probably paid considerably more than a Turkish horse archer.

[27] The granting of pronoia (from eis pronoian 'to administer'), beginning in the reign of Alexios I, was to become a notable element in the military infrastructure towards the end of the Komnenian period, though it became even more important subsequently.

[31] During the Komnenian period the earlier names for the basic units of the Byzantine cavalry, bandon and moira, gradually disappear to be replaced by the allagion (ἀλλάγιον), believed to have been between 300 and 500 men strong.

[45] Towards the end of the period pronoia revenue grants, from the income generated by parcels of land, allowed the provinces to be used to raise heavy cavalrymen with less immediate drain on the state treasury.

However, if the foreign contingent were particularly large and its leader a powerful and prominent figure then it might remain separate; Baldwin of Antioch commanded a major division, composed of Westerners (Antiochenes, Hungarians and other 'Latins'), of the Byzantine army at the Battle of Myriokephalon.

The Byzantines usually took care to mix ethnic groups within the formations making up a field army in order to minimize the risk of all the soldiers of a particular nationality changing sides or decamping to the rear during battle.

Swords were of two types: the spathion which was straight and double-edged and differed only in details of the hilt from the typical 'sword of war' found in Western Europe, and the paramērion which appears to have been a form of single-edged, perhaps slightly curved, sabre.

Because of the expense of its manufacture, in particular the lamellae surrounding the arm and neck apertures had to be individually shaped, this form of armour was probably largely confined to heavy cavalry and elite units.

[84] Icons of soldier-saints, often showing very detailed illustrations of body armour, usually depict their subjects bare-headed for devotional reasons and therefore give no information on helmets and other head protection.

This rounded helmet is horizontally divided: with a brow-band constructed for the attachment of a face-covering camail, above this is a deep lower skull section surmounted by an upper skull-piece raised from a single plate.

The most often illustrated example of such armour is a sectioned skirt depending from the back and sides of the helmet; this may have been of quilted construction, leather strips or of metal splint reinforced fabric.

It is therefore very likely that horse armour continued to be used by the Byzantines through the Komnenian era; though its use was probably limited to the very wealthiest of the provincial kataphraktoi, aristocrats serving in the army, members of some guards units and the imperial household.

[97] Additionally, the Byzantines also used long range, anti-personnel, bolt firing machines such as the 'great crossbow,' which was often mounted on a mobile chassis, and the 'skein-bow' or 'espringal' which was a torsion device using twisted skeins of silk or sinew to power two bow-arms.

The emperor John II and the generals Stephanos and Andronikos Kontostephanos, both leading commanders with the rank of megas doux, are recorded personally operating siege engines.

[99] The Byzantine Empire was a highly developed society with a long military history and could recruit soldiers from various peoples, both within and beyond its borders; as a result of these factors a wide variety of troop types were to be found in its army.

The charge of the western knight was held in considerable awe by the Byzantines; Anna Komnene stated that "A mounted Kelt [an archaism for a Norman or Frank] is irresistible; he would bore his way through the walls of Babylon.

The level of military effectiveness, especially the quality of the armour and mount, of the individual provincial kataphraktos probably varied considerably, as both John II and Manuel I are recorded as employing formations of "picked lancers" who were taken from their parent units and combined.

It is probable that the Byzantine heavy cavalry traditionally made charges at relatively slow speed, certainly the deep wedge formations described in Nikephoros II Phokas' day would have been impossible to deploy at anything faster than a round trot.

[134] The Byzantines may have suffered considerable disruption to access to Cappadocia and Northern Syria, traditional sources of good quality cavalry mounts, in the wake of the fall of Anatolia to the Turks.

The Byzantine horse-archers (termed doryphoroi – indicating guard status) at Sozopolis in 1120 performed a feigned flight manoeuvre, always demanding the greatest self-confidence and discipline, which led to the taking of the city from the Turks.

[149] Later in his reign, when the empire had recovered territory and its economic condition had improved, the increased monetary revenue available allowed Alexios to impose a greater regularity on the army, with a higher proportion of troops raised directly by the state; however, the extended imperial family continued to play a very prominent role.

Soldiers were also drawn from defeated peoples, who were forcibly recruited into the army; examples include the Pechenegs (horse archers) and Serbs, who were transplanted as military settlers to the regions around Moglena and Nicomedia respectively.

In the reign of Alexios I pronoia grants were limited to members of the imperial family and their close connections; Manuel extended the system to include men of considerably more lowly social origins and foreigners.

First there was Alexios II, a child-emperor with a divided regency, then a tyrant, Andronikos I, who attempted to break the power of the aristocracy who provided the leadership of the army, and finally the incompetents of the Angeloi dynasty.