Konoe statements

After the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937, Japan initially planned to further occupy Shanghai after taking control of North China, aiming to force the Nationalist government to capitulate, cease fighting, and enter negotiations.

The defence of Nanjing aimed to provide retreating troops with an opportunity to regroup and to draw Japanese forces deeper into China's interior.

Until Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, a total of 904 airplanes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 cannons, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, and 31,600 bombs were provided to China.

At the end of May, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhang Qun sent a congratulatory telegram to his old acquaintance Kazushige Ugaki and proposed exploratory peace talks, indicating that he and Wang Jingwei were open to negotiations.

On June 23, the representative of H. H. Kung, his secretary Qiao Fusan, went to Hong Kong to meet with Japanese Consul Tomoichi Nakamura, expressing that Chiang Kai-shek internally wished for peace but could not publicly state this due to his position, and suggested that the UK and the US should mediate.

On July 15, Qiao Fusan held a secret meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and H. H. Kung in Wuhan and on July 18 proposed Chiang Kai-shek's conditions for peace talks, including China's cessation of anti-Japanese activities, signing a tripartite treaty between Japan, Manchukuo, and China indirectly recognizing Manchukuo's independence, recognizing Inner Mongolia's autonomy, not recognizing North China's autonomy but agreeing to joint development, discussing a demilitarized zone upon Japan's specific request, considering joining an anti-communist pact, and stating the Chinese government's inability to pay war reparations.

H. H. Kung indicated to Japan that Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to abandon Wuhan and hoped to implement peace talks before its fall, as it would be difficult to negotiate afterwards.

[12][13] After the first Konoe statement, Army personnel including Sadaaki Kagesa [ja] and Takeo Imai took the initiative to approach Wang Jingwei for peace negotiations.

On November 20, both parties reached an agreement, which covered "good-neighbourliness and friendship, joint defence against communism, and economic cooperation," and reported it to the Japanese government and Wang Jingwei.

Subsequently, in an Imperial Conference on November 30, the Japanese government decided on "The Guidelines for Adjusting the New Relationship between Japan and China," making it a national policy.

The declaration also stated that Japan would respect Chinese sovereignty and independence, consider abolishing consular jurisdiction, and return foreign concessions in China.

Chiang Kai-shek argued that the third Konoe statement not only showed Japan's shift from continental to maritime expansion but also marked a shift from a northward to a southward expansion policy, indicating that Japan's aggressive plans targeted not only China but also aimed to disrupt the international order, dominate East Asia, and exclude European and American powers.

"[14][17] In June 1939, Japan decided to support Wang Jingwei in establishing a "New Central Government of China," requiring him to accept the "Konoe Three Principles."

In November, Japan and Wang Jingwei held confidential talks in Shanghai to confirm and refine the "Konoe Three Principles," resulting in the "Wang-Japan Secret Agreement."

[14] Following the first Konoe statement, Japanese Foreign Minister Kazushige Ugaki directed negotiations with the ambassadors of Britain and the US in Japan concerning their interests in China.

The British Foreign Office believed it prudent to observe the impact of the US' actions and avoid making too many concessions in negotiations with Japan, so as not to weaken the American stance.

[18] The second Konoe statement reflected Japan's attempt to establish an exclusive market, especially its efforts to bring China under its control, which contravened the "Open Door" principle of the Nine-Power Treaty.

In July 1939, the US abrogated the US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and in November, amended the Neutrality Act, lifting the arms embargo on belligerent nations.