The entire campaign, with logistical support from the Republic of China which had retreated to Taiwan, the United States, and Thailand, was controversial from the start, as it weakened Burmese sovereignty and introduced the KMT's involvement in the region's lucrative opium trade.

In 1953, the frustrated Burmese government appealed to the United Nations and put international pressure on the Republic of China to withdraw its troops to Taiwan the following year.

"[2] After Burma fell under colonial rule as a consequence of the Anglo-Burmese Wars, Britain administered the region as a province of British India as opposed to an independent entity.

While the Burman majority in Central Burma were under direct British control, ethnic minorities in the border regions were placed under indirect rule by Britain.

Just when the Burmese government thought it had achieved some measure of political stability and could focus on the urgent task of nation building, the KMT threat arrived on its northeastern borders.

It was centrally located in a fertile basin endowed with approximately sixty square miles of rice cultivation area, and it was surrounded by hilly terrain on all sides that acted as natural defense barriers.

[7] The main reason for KMT's intransigence was its intention to use Burma as a refuge to reorganize, train, and equip themselves for the purpose of launching an invasion to retake Mainland China.

The KMT made two more abortive attempts in July 1951 and August 1952 that took heavy casualties, after which they never invaded Yunnan again and instead "settled along the border to gather intelligence and monitor signs of a possible Communist Chinese advance into Southeast Asia.

The enlarged airstrip could handle large four-engine aircraft and allowed the KMT troops to obtain newly manufactured American weapons from Taiwan.

The KMT usually dealt with a powerful Thai police commander and client of the CIA, General Phao Sriyanond, who shipped the opium from Chiang Mai to Bangkok for both local consumption and export.

Starting in late 1951, the KMT made contacts and formed a loose alliance with the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), the largest of the still active indigenous insurgent groups.

As different groups within Burma desired to support one or the other bloc in the Cold War, it was in the government's interests to follow a neutralist policy in order to avoid antagonizing either the pro-Western minorities or the pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese communists.

On the other hand, Burma was located between neutral India to the west, Communist China to the north, and war-torn Laos and pro-West Thailand to the east.

[16] The Burmese government feared that the presence of the anti-communist KMT troops on its borders would antagonize Communist China and provide it with an excuse to invade Burma.

On its part, Communist China was concerned that the United States might open a second front in its southern provinces by using Burma as a base of operations and the KMT troops as a nucleus for an invasion army.

Third, China displayed its belligerence in Yunnan Province by amassing an estimated 200,000 troops, as well as building and repairing roads that led to Burma.

[20] With the assistance of Red Chinese troops, the Burmese Army conducted a series of successful military operations in 1960–1961 that finally "broke the back" of the KMT irregulars.

The diplomatic crisis that ensued prompted the United States to exert strong pressure on Taiwan to evacuate its remaining troops from Burma.

Initially the Shans were largely loyal to the newly independent Burmese government throughout the KMT crisis as they were a signatory to the historic Panglong Agreement that granted them secession rights.

When it came to time for the Shans to deliberate on their status within the Union in 1958, the negative experience of the Army's repressive actions was an additional argument for greater autonomy.

As a result, the Burmese Army led by Ne Win, determined to maintain the integrity of the Union, mounted a coup against the government and abrogated both the 1947 Constitution and the rights of the Shan and Karenni states to secede.

Callahan argues that the Burmese Army's transformation gave it enormous autonomy and authority to define who were citizens and enemies in the ethnically diverse state.

Robert Taylor (1973) makes a similar argument about the significant consequences KMT intervention had on Burma's political, economic and ethnic problems.

He argues that Operation Paper, the covert CIA program devised to aid the KMT troops in Burma, was a complete failure for the United States.

Not only had the United States failed to contain Sino-Burmese relations, it had alienated Burma through its handling of the KMT issue and its failure to restrain the Chinese Nationalists.

[1] The escape of the KMT and their dependents from Yunnan Province to Burma has been given a sympathetic portrayal in A Home Too Far, a 1990 Taiwanese war drama film directed by Kevin Chu starring Andy Lau and Tou Chung-hua.