[5] Even though the report stated that "the pilots had fulfilled technical and psychological requirements", and that "their experience, both in general flight, and with this kind of aircraft was suitable for the job they were performing", a lawsuit later determined that Weigel was not fit to fly, since his license had expired.

The penal prosecution focused on proving that the company's policies and organization, lacking the Argentine Air Force's controls, were the main factors that led to the accident.

The aforementioned briefing started with the rest of the flight's crew, and when the first officer arrived, they went back over the weather conditions –which were good– and the NOTAMs for the destination airport as well as for alternative ones.

Having seen the good weather conditions, the captain selected Aeroparque Jorge Newbery as the alternative airport and decided on the fuel requirements for the flight.

This confusing situation, in which the PCL was interspersed with conversation irrelevant to the crew's task, persisted during "push back," engine start and taxiing, up to the moment of take-off, which was delayed by other aircraft waiting ahead of the LAPA flight and heavy arriving traffic.

[5][excessive quote]The report details:[citation needed] In its final run after failing to take off, the aircraft hit a Chrysler Neon car that was travelling on the Rafael Obligado road that crosses the projection of Runway 13.

Finally, another flight attendant succeeded in opening the rear left door allowing several passengers to be evacuated before the fire propagated itself.

The early reports also considered that the absence of a food or drinks trolley in the rear galley of the aircraft helped, since walking distance to the exit was notably reduced.

The analysis led investigators to believe that the aircraft, its components and its engines complied with the requirements set out in the maintenance plan and the approved operational specifications of the Dirección Nacional de Aeronavegabilidad (National Board of Airworthiness).

[12] By the end of August, near the one-year anniversary of the tragedy, the investigation had accumulated 1,600 pages of findings in 80 sections, it had heard 1,500 witnesses, and 34 indictments were carried through the judicial process.

At this point, the various sources of information had rendered enough evidence to show that, although the direct cause of the accident was human error, the pilot was in no condition to command an airplane; thus, the responsibility also fell partly on company officials and various high-level heads of the Air Force.

The LAPA officials were charged with estrago culposo seguido de muerte (similar to 'catastrophic criminal negligence leading to death') and included: Likewise, several members of the Air Force were prosecuted for dereliction of duty in public office: When the resolution was released, it also called for seizing the assets of LAPA president Gustavo Deutsch in the amount of 40 million pesos, 500,000 for Director General Ronaldo Boyd, and 100,000 for each of the other managers.

With respect to the motive behind accusing the LAPA officials, La Nación drew upon the judicial resolution: There are by now enough prima facie elements to sustain that the accused negligently performed those duties and obligations that were assigned to them, consequently creating a dangerous situation that ultimately produced the disaster investigated, from the arrival of commander Gustavo Weigel to the company, allowing the development of his career within it, to the moment of the assembly of the crew that was in charge of flight 3142 on 31 August 1999.

"[16] With respect to the motive behind accusing the military personnel, the judge made the following comment about the Command of Aerial Regiones (CRA) of the Air Force: The CRA has not yet established a clear policy for the selection of inspectors, nor plans for the initial and periodical instructions of its personnel that would contemplate the minimum requirements to perform their functions in the areas of license handling and operation supervision.

[17] Two years after its inception, the case's file had 110 sections, over a thousand testimonies, and seven accused individuals who awaited the ruling of the Federal Court as to whether they would be brought to jury trial proceedings.

At the same time, it recognized the lack of merit of flight instructors Vicente Sánchez, Alberto Baigorria, José Héctor García, and Juan Carlos Ossa.

[19][20] Among the military officials, the Federal Court decided to revoke the accusations levelled initially against Enrique Dutra, Damián Peterson, and Diego Lentino.

According to the material contained in the file that was incorporated into the judicial review, it was noted as early as April 1994 that Weigel "appeared slow" and that "he should improve his command of lists and procedures ...

The following day, Clarín revealed that federal officials "in a 40-page letter, presented to Federal Judge Sergio Torres, stated that at the time of the LAPA accident, they did not have a revised and approved Operations Manual provided by the Command of Aerial Regions" and that "this document was required and should have regulated the organizational and administrative structure of the airline, the minimum equipment that a plane should have, and even the procedures to be followed in the case of an accident.

"[21] At the same time, La Nación claimed that "Arzeno was responsible for a little-known fact: Weigel, while he should have not been permitted to fly after his previous actions, also should not have been in command of an airplane on the day of the tragedy because his license was expired.

[check quotation syntax] For the congressmen, there was a "clear relationship" between the courses that Pilot Weigel had not completed and "the violations that occurred in the cockpit" on that fateful day, something that was not caught by the managers who controlled the process.

The request, roughly 600 pages in length, called for a judgment on Gustavo Deutsch, Ronaldo Boyd, Fabián Chionetti, Nora Arzeno, Valerio Diehl, and Gabriel Borsani for estrago culposo (catastrophic criminal negligence).

In a similar vein, it requested the judgement of Enrique Dutra, Damián Peterson, and Diego Lentino, asking that they be charged for "failure to fulfill the duties of public office".

"[check quotation syntax][24] On 9 June 2005, the Federal Court of Appeals rejected the nullification motions that several of the accused had proposed, and it ordered them to jury trial.

[25][excessive quote]On 5 July 2005, Judge Torres ruled the process complete and elevated all of the accused to jury trial, consequently forming a tribunal to try them.

The judge highlighted "the constant and permanent contact and direct participation that Deutsch and Boyd had in the politics of advancement in the business" and he reproached them for "the lack of effective control that might have made it possible for the pilots to overcome the errors committed."

As for the members of the Air Force, they will be tried for neglecting to observe the law pertaining to content control of the Operations Manual of the airline industry and the norms for training airplane pilots.

The crime of which the former officials stand accused carries a penalty of up to two years of prison and special incarceration can double the time when the offense is committed while in public office.

[30] As for the LAPA officials, they were charged with estrago culposo (negligence followed by death) instead, a crime with a maximum sentence of four years of prison, thus they could not yet appeal to the statute of limitation.

The court was designated to be composed by judges Leopoldo Bruglia, María Cristina Sanmartino and Horacio Vaccare, but the last one decided to recuse himself after relatives of the victims disputed his impartiality.