The amphibious landings were carried out by elements of the United States Marine Corps in November 1943 on Bougainville Island in the South Pacific, as part of Allied efforts to advance towards the main Japanese base around Rabaul under Operation Cartwheel.

Japanese aircraft from Rabaul attempted to interdict the landing force, but their attacks proved ineffective and they were largely fought off by US and New Zealand fighters.

[4] Situated south-east of New Britain, Bougainville offered the Allies another step in their advance through the Solomons towards the main Japanese base that had been established around Rabaul.

[6] The Japanese had invaded Bougainville in early 1942, and had established several airfields on the island, with key bases being constructed around Buka, at Kahili and Kieta, and on the Bonis Peninsula.

From these bases, the Japanese had struck south towards Guadalcanal, in an effort to sever sea lanes of communication between the United States and Australia.

[7] Japanese air and naval movements around Bougainville had been monitored by a small group of Allied Coastwatchers, who were able to gain considerable intelligence through the native population of the island.

However, by early 1943, with the conclusion of the Guadalcanal Campaign in the Allies' favor, and a string of defeats in the central Solomons, the Japanese had sought to consolidate their hold on Bougainville.

It was decided to bypass the Shortland Islands and Kahili, and to seize a lodgment on Bougainville, with the view to establishing an airbase from which to project airpower towards Rabaul.

[14] US planning staff predicted that it would take the Japanese three months to launch a counterattack on Torokina due to the terrain and the distance from their main troop concentrations.

In addition, elements of the 17th Division were scheduled to reinforce northern Bougainville in mid-November,[16] and ultimately they played no part in repelling the landings at Cape Torokina on 1–3 November.

[23] Troops in the immediate area of Cape Torokina numbered around 270 men, drawn mainly from a single company of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment.

This operation envisaged severing Allied lines of communication to inflict delay on the forces advancing towards Rabaul, while the Japanese reduced and consolidated their defensive perimeter in the Southwest and Central Pacific, in consequence of a decision made in September 1943.

[34] The Bougainville invasion was the ultimate responsibility of Admiral William F. Halsey, commander South Pacific Area, at his headquarters at Nouméa, New Caledonia.

The landings were under the personal direction of Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, commander III Amphibious Force, aboard his flagship, attack transport USS George Clymer.

These parties were inserted by a variety of means (motor boat, submarine, or seaplane) to carry out patrols, study the terrain, and gather intelligence from locals, while aerial reconnaissance was also undertaken to the north and south of Bougainville.

[44] Pre-war charts of Bougainville proved to be quite inaccurate, and although aerial reconnaissance and information gathered from submarine patrols had been used to update these, they remained imperfect, particularly with respect to longitude.

The 3rd Marine Raider Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, captured Puruata Island, about 1,000 yards (910 m) northwest of the cape, against a well entrenched Japanese force.

[46] Because of the possibility of an immediate Japanese counterattack by air units, the assault was planned to ensure a smooth landing that would allow the transports to withdraw quickly.

[26] Shelling from the Japanese 75 mm gun destroyed four landing craft and damaged ten others until a lone effort from a Marine restored the situation for the Americans.

At the cost of his life, Sergeant Robert A. Owens from Company A, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, approached the gun emplacement, entered it through the fire port, and drove the crew out the back door.

[52] In response to the landing, a large force of Japanese aircraft (44 fighters and 9 dive bombers) was scrambled from Rabaul, arriving over Empress Augusta Bay at 07:35.

Arriving over the transport area, their attack proved largely ineffective, though they did manage to inflict a near miss on the destroyer USS Wadsworth, resulting in two killed and five wounded.

The Japanese airbases at Kahili, Kieta, Buka, and Balalae had been knocked out before the invasion but were quickly repaired and used for night bombing attacks.

[56] Meanwhile, the aircraft carriers USS Saratoga and Princeton of Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's Task Force 38 launched further airstrikes against the airfields around the Buka Passage on 1–2 November.

Several secondary objectives were also achieved, including the 3rd Marine Division receiving its first engagement in the war, and the incremental reduction of Japanese air power around Rabaul.

[61] In the days following the landings, the Japanese carrier aircraft were eventually able to reinforce the 11th Air Fleet, and several attacks were carried out on 5, 8, 11 and 17 November.

They arrived at a time when the US Navy's capital ships were unavailable to respond, having been called back to Pearl Harbor to prepare for the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign.

They arrived aboard high-speed transports (APDs) and the slower LSTs, which had been held back initially due to fears of air attack.

[68] Throughout November, US forces established a perimeter around Cape Torokina, during which significant base development work was undertaken with eight naval construction battalions (Seabees) and a brigade of New Zealand engineers being deployed.

[77] Beginning on 15 December, the Japanese began an effort to move ground troops from southern Bougainville to the Torokina perimeter by barge.