[citation needed] Approval, instant-runoff, highest medians, and score all satisfy the later-no-help criterion.
Later-No-Help can be considered not applicable to Anti-Plurality if the method is assumed to not accept truncated preference listings from the voter.
On the other hand, Later-No-Help can be applied to Anti-Plurality if the method is assumed to apportion the last place vote among unlisted candidates equally, as shown in the example below.
Assume four voters (marked bold) submit a truncated preference listing A > B = C by apportioning the possible orderings for B and C equally.
The four voters supporting A increase the probability of A winning by adding later preference C to their ballot, changing A from a loser to the winner.
Thus, Anti-plurality fails the Later-no-help criterion when truncated ballots are considered to apportion the last place vote amongst unlisted candidates equally.
Later-No-Help can be considered not applicable to Coombs if the method is assumed to not accept truncated preference listings from the voter.
On the other hand, Later-No-Help can be applied to Coombs if the method is assumed to apportion the last place vote among unlisted candidates equally, as shown in the example below.
Assume four voters (marked bold) submit a truncated preference listing A > B = C by apportioning the possible orderings for B and C equally.
The four voters supporting A increase the probability of A winning by adding later preference C to their ballot, changing A from a loser to the winner.
Thus, Coombs' method fails the Later-no-help criterion when truncated ballots are considered to apportion the last place vote amongst unlisted candidates equally.
Later-No-Help can be considered not applicable to Dodgson if the method is assumed to not accept truncated preference listings from the voter.
On the other hand, Later-No-Help can be applied to Dodgson if the method is assumed to apportion possible rankings among unlisted candidates equally, as shown in the example below.
Assume ten voters (marked bold) submit a truncated preference listing A > B = C by apportioning the possible orderings for B and C equally.
Now assume that the ten voters supporting A (marked bold) add later preference C, as follows: Result: There is no Condorcet winner.
The ten voters supporting A increase the probability of A winning by adding later preference C to their ballot, changing A from a loser to the winner.
Thus, Dodgson's method fails the Later-no-help criterion when truncated ballots are considered to apportion the possible rankings amongst unlisted candidates equally.