This "pink tide" thus saw the successive elections of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998), Lula in Brazil (2002), Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2006), Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2006), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008), José Mujica in Uruguay (2009), Ollanta Humala in Peru (2011), Luis Guillermo Solís in Costa Rica (2014), Salvador Sánchez Cerén in El Salvador (2014), and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico (2018).

In particular, Chávez and Morales seem more disposed to ally together, while Kirchner and Lula, who has been criticized by the left-wing in Brazil, including by the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST) landless peasants movement (who, however, did call to vote for him on his second term), are seen as more centered.

[5] The era of the Good Neighbor Policy ended with the ramp-up of the Cold War in 1945, as the United States felt there was a greater need to protect the western hemisphere from Soviet Union influence and a potential rise of communism.

In addition, Argentina is a major non-NATO ally of the United States, the result of a policy of reapproachment and market liberalization led by President Carlos Menem during the 1990s which saw the country send troops as part of the coalition in the Gulf War and become one of the world's largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.

Juan Vicente Bolívar Palacios, Jose Rafael Revenga and Telesforo Orea managed to attract the interest of the government of President James Madison to support the Supreme Junta.

As a result of the mexican president at the time, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's capture, the newdly United States were able to purchase New Mexico, Arizona, California and adjacent areas.

In 1862, French forces under Napoleon III invaded and conquered Mexico, giving control to the monarch Emperor Maximilian I. Washington denounced this as a violation of the Monroe doctrine, but was unable to intervene because of the American Civil War.

[citation needed] The United States tried to bring an early end to the War of the Pacific in 1879, mainly because of US business interests in Peru, but also because American leaders were worried that the British government would take economic control of the region through Chile.

[30][31] After the mysterious sinking of the US Navy battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, political pressures from the Democratic Party pushed the administration of Republican President William McKinley into a war he had wished to avoid.

US naval power proved decisive, allowing expeditionary forces to disembark in Cuba against a Spanish garrison already facing nationwide Cuban insurgent attacks and further wasted by yellow fever.

[34] Numerically superior Cuban, Philippine and US forces obtained the surrender of Santiago de Cuba and Manila despite the good performance of some Spanish infantry units and fierce fighting for positions such as San Juan Hill.

The U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt's concern with the threat of penetration into the region by Germany and the increasingly negative British and American press reactions to the affair led to the blockading nations agreement to a compromise.

"Dollar diplomacy" was evident in extensive U.S. interventions in Cuba, Central America and Venezuela, especially in measures undertaken by the United States government to safeguard American financial interests in the region.

[58][59] After the United States declared war on Germany in December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation drafted a list of Germans in fifteen Latin American countries it suspected of subversive activities and demanded their eviction to the U.S. for detention.

The U.S. had maintained a hemispheric defense policy under the Monroe Doctrine and, during the 1930s, had been alarmed by Axis overtures toward military cooperation with Latin American governments, in particular apparent strategic threats against the Panama Canal.

The resolution, passed fourteen to one (the Dominican Republic dissented while Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, and Uruguay abstained), marked the first time that the organization had taken such actions against a member nation.

The coup attempt that followed failed to seize power and all of the conspirators except Imbert were found and executed by Ramfis Trujillo, the dictator's son, who remained in de facto control of the government for the next six months through his position as commander of the armed forces.

Later that year, U.S. diplomats Edwin L. Sweet and Wiliam G. Friedman were arrested and expelled from the island, having been charged with "encouraging terrorist acts, granting asylum, financing subversive publications and smuggling weapons".

[67] Besides this aggressive policy towards Cuba, John F. Kennedy tried to implement the Alliance for Progress, an economic aid program which proved to be too shy signed at an inter-American conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961.

Through the Office of Public Safety, an organization dependent of the USAID and close to the CIA, the US assisted Latin American security forces, training them in interrogation methods, riot control, and sending them materiel.

Starting in 1975, a "Dirty War" was waged all over the subcontinent, called Operation Condor, an agreement between security services of the Southern Cone and other South American countries to repress and assassinate exiled political opponents, which was backed by the CIA.

In the 1980s, the situation progressively evolved in the world as in South America, despite a renewal of the Cold War from 1979 to 1985, the year during which Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Konstantin Chernenko as leader of the USSR, and began to implement the glasnost and the perestroika democratic-inspired reforms.

This democratization of South America found a symbol in the OAS' adoption of Resolution 1080 in 1991, which requires the Secretary General to convene the Permanent Council within ten days of a coup d'état in any member country.

However, at the same time, Washington started to aggressively pursue the "War on Drugs", which included the invasion of Panama in 1989 to overthrow Manuel Noriega, who had been a long-time ally of the US and had even worked for the CIA before his reign as leader of the country.

[74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81] This "pink tide" thus saw the successive elections of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998), Lula in Brazil (2002), Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2006), Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2006), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008), José Mujica in Uruguay (2009), Ollanta Humala in Peru (2011), Luis Guillermo Solís in Costa Rica (2014), Salvador Sánchez Cerén in El Salvador (2014), and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico (2018).

[82] In particular, Chávez and Morales seem more disposed to ally together, while Kirchner and Lula, who has been criticized by the left-wing in Brazil, including by the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST) landless peasants movement (who, however, did call to vote for him on his second term[83][84]), are seen as more centered.

During his presidency Solís established close relationships with some Progressive governments of South America, to the point of leaving the United Nations' chambers during Michel Temer's speech in protest for Rousseff's impeachment in September 2016.

[93] On the other hand, a number of Latin American countries located in the Pacific such as Chile, Mexico and Peru have signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam.

[97] Such BIT were passed between the US and numerous countries (the given date is not of signature but of entrance in force of the treaty): Argentina (1994), Bolivia (2001), Ecuador (1997), Grenada (1989), Honduras (2001), Jamaica (1997), Panama (1991, amended in 2001), Trinidad and Tobago (1996).

The nationalizations, which, according to Vice President Álvaro García, are supposed to make the government's energy-related revenue jump to $780 million in the following year, expanding nearly sixfold from 2002,[103] led to criticisms from Brazil, which Petrobras company is one of the largest foreign investors in Bolivia, controlling 14 percent of the country's gas reserves.