The introduction of packet-switched networks, softswitch technology, and server-based applications during the past two decades fundamentally altered how LI is undertaken.
Lawful interception differs from the dragnet-type mass surveillance sometimes done by intelligence agencies, where all data passing a fiber-optic splice or other collection point is extracted for storage or filtering.
Under some legal systems, implementations—particularly real-time access to content—may require due process and receiving proper authorization from competent authorities—an activity that was formerly known as "wiretapping" and has existed since the inception of electronic communications.
[7] To prevent investigations' being compromised, LI systems may be designed in a manner that hides the interception from the telecommunications operator concerned.
Alternatively, LI systems may be designed using technology such as transparent decryption, which ensures that access or interception is necessarily overt in order to disincentivize abuse of authority.
The architecture is now applied worldwide (in some cases with slight variations in terminology), including in the United States in the context of CALEA conformance.
Communications data and content are typically delivered from the network operator to the LEA in an encrypted format over an IP-based VPN.
Voice-over-IP likewise has its own IRI, including data derived from Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) messages that are used to set up and tear down a VOIP call.
The principal global treaty-based legal instrument relating to LI (including retained data) is the Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest, 23 Nov 2001).
The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Title III pertains mainly to lawful interception criminal investigations.
The Administrator of the U.S. Courts annual reports indicate that the federal cases are related to illegal drug distribution, with cell phones as the dominant form of intercepted communication.
It was revealed in 2013 mass surveillance disclosures that since 2007, the National Security Administration has been collecting connection metadata for all calls in the United States under the authority of section 215 PATRIOT Act, with the mandatory cooperation of phone companies and with the approval of the FISA court and briefings to Congress.
[11] Police ability to lawfully intercept private communications is governed by Part VI of the Criminal Code of Canada (Invasion Of Privacy).
[13] In June 2014, the Supreme Court ruled that law enforcement officers need a search warrant before accessing information from internet service providers about users’ identities.
Essentially, the Supreme Court of Canada argued that police are allowed access to a suspect’s cell phone, but they must abide by very strict guidelines.
After robbing a Toronto Jewelry kiosk, Fearon argued that the police unlawfully violated his charter rights upon searching his cellphone without a warrant.
Although divided, the Supreme Court laid out very detailed criteria for law enforcement officers to follow when searching a suspect's phone without a warrant.
There are four rules which officers must follow in these instances: To continue a search without a warrant, the situation at-hand would need to meet three of the four guidelines stated above.
Nonetheless, the court highly encourages law enforcement to request a warrant before searching a cellphone to promote and protect privacy in Canada.
Rule 4 of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules 2009 provides that ‘the competent authority may authorise an agency of the Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource for the purpose specified in sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Act’.
These powers are also available to the competent authority in the State governments as per IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules 2009.
According to Monshizadeh et al., the event is representative of mobile networks and Internet Service Providers vulnerability to cyber attacks because they use outdated LI mechanism.