Since the late 1970s, Lin and the wife of Mao, Jiang Qing, have been labeled the two major "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution, receiving official blame from the Chinese government for the worst excesses of that period.

The contrast between Mao's top field commanders could hardly have been more sharp, but on the Long March they worked well together, Lin specializing in feints, masked strategy, surprises, ambushes, flank attacks, pounces from the rear, and stratagems.

Peng did not believe a battle well fought unless he managed to replenish—and more than replenish—any losses by seizure of enemy guns and converting prisoners of war to new and loyal recruits to the Red Army.

Engaged on the front in more than a hundred battles, in field command for more than 10 years, exposed to every hardship that his men have known, with a reward of $100,000 on his head, he miraculously remained unhurt and in good health.

[23] In August 1937, Lin was named commander-in-chief of the 115th Division of the Communist 8th Route Army[2] and ordered to aid Yan Xishan's forces in repelling the Japanese invasion of Shanxi.

While they did so, they looted large quantities of supplies and destroyed the infrastructure of the KMT-held territories that they passed through, including bridges, railroads, fortifications, electrical lines, and boats.

On 5 May, he held a conference with his subordinates and announced that his armies would change tactics, engage in a large-scale counterattack, and seek to defeat Du's forces in a decisive battle.

[37] Chen's forces remained static and reactionary, at the end of 1947, Lin led his armies back south in his final Liaoshen Campaign, the Winter Offensive.

His initial plan was to repeat the goal of his last offensive, to besiege Jilin City and ambush its relief force, but after reviewing Kuomintang troop dispositions he determined that southern Manchuria would be an easier target.

When Chen did not intervene and the town fell on 28 December, Lin assumed the main part of the campaign was over and he dispersed his forces to rest and attack secondary targets.

On 26 February Lin reorganized his forces as the Northeastern Field Army and began preparations to return and take Siping, whose garrison had been transferred elsewhere by Chen Cheng and never re-strengthened.

By 25 May 1948, the Northeastern Field Army had completely encircled Changchun, including its airfield, and for the rest of the siege the Nationalist commander, Zheng Dongguo, depended entirely on supplies airdropped into the city.

[41] After hearing the news about the defeat at Jinzhou, a KMT army from Yunnan and its commander, Zeng Zesheng, defected and abandoned its position on the outskirts of Changchun on 14 October.

Chiang ordered the 9th army of 110,000 men under General Liao Yaoxiang to travel west and retake Jinzhou, but Lin directed nearly all of his forces to stop them, and they began to encircle the relief unit on 21 October.

[19] Following the victory in Manchuria, Lin commanded over a million soldiers, encircling Chiang's main forces in northern China during the Pingjin Campaign, taking Beijing and Tianjin within a period of two months.

[49] In early October 1950, Peng Dehuai was named commander of the Chinese forces bound for Korea, and Lin went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment.

The most important figures to whom Lin deferred the day-to-day operations of China's armed forces were Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff, and He Long, the Central Military Vice-chairman.

Privately, he expressed unhappiness with the Cultural Revolution, but was unable to avoid playing a high-profile role due to the expectations of Mao, China's unpredictable political environment, and the manipulations of his wife and son, Ye Qun and Lin Liguo.

Lin was supported by Jiang Qing in his opposition to pursuing a relationship with the United States, but was not able to permanently disrupt Zhou's efforts to contact the American officials.

Lin's followers attempted to use the hysteria generated by the incident in an effort to deepen the power that they had gained during the Cultural Revolution, disregarding and acting against the interests of Zhou Enlai and his supporters.

[84] Lin died when an aircraft carrying him and several members of his family crashed in Mongolia at 3:00 am[85] on 13 September 1971, allegedly after attempting to assassinate Mao and defect to the Soviet Union.

[82] After realizing it had failed, Lin Biao and associates attempted to flee to the Soviet Union and boarded a prearranged Trident 1-E (registered as CAAC B-256), piloted by Pan Jingyin, the deputy commander of the PLAAF 34th division.

Skeptics assert the official narrative does not sufficiently explain why Lin, one of Mao's closest supporters and one of the most successful Communist generals, would suddenly attempt a poorly planned, abortive coup.

[25] A six-month investigation by Western scholars in 1994 examined evidence in Russia, Mongolia, mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan, and came to a number of conclusions, some of which were contrary to the official Chinese version of events.

[88] In 1971, a Soviet forensic investigation was not able to determine the cause of the crash, but hypothesized the pilot misjudged his altitude while intentionally flying low to evade radar.

[86] On 14 September, Zhou announced to the Politburo that four of the highest-ranking military officials in China were immediately suspended from duty and ordered to submit self-criticisms admitting their associations with Lin.

Without the support of Lin, Jiang was unable to prevent Zhou's efforts to improve China's relationship with the United States, or to rehabilitate cadres who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution.

[94] Throughout the 1970s, high-ranking leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, including Hua Guofeng, spread the story to foreign delegates that Lin had conspired with the KGB to assassinate Mao.

[86] According to the official Party verdict, Lin and Jiang were singled out for blame because they led intra-Party cliques which took advantage of Mao's "mistakes" to advance their own political goals, engaging in "criminal activity" for their own self-benefit.

In 2007, a big portrait of Lin was added to the Chinese Military Museum in Beijing, included in a display of the "Ten Marshals", a group considered to be the founders of China's armed forces.