Lithuanian conferences during World War I
The conferences in Switzerland and Sweden, as neutral countries, provided an avenue for them to discuss political realities and create visions for the future of independent Lithuania.
[13] The conference was organized by Juozas Gabrys, who was introduced to Latvian activists by Atis Ķeniņš [lv], and Antanas Viskantas.
[14] The representatives adopted a resolution which expressed their solidarity with the Entente Powers and condemned atrocities committed by German troops.
They resolved to seek vast autonomy (not yet full independence) for a joint Lithuanian–Latvian state that would encompass a territory of 250,000 square kilometres (97,000 sq mi).
[17][18] Yčas wanted to organize a much broader conference with Lithuanian representatives from Lithuania, Russia, Western Europe, and United States and was disappointed that only Gabrys could attend.
[5] Nevertheless, the men established a war refugee relief organization, the Swedish–Lithuanian Aid Committee (Lithuanian: Švedų-lietuvių šelpimo komitetas), which included chairman Carl Lindhagen, mayor of Stockholm, secretary Verner Söderberg [sv], editor of Stockholms Dagblad, and Lithuanian manager Jonas Aukštuolis.
The Poles sought to resurrect the old Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth which Lithuanians perceived as a threat to their national identity and as an usurpation of their self-determination rights.
[21] The second conference in Bern was held two months later, in April 1916, in reaction[6] to a speech by Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of Germany, in the Reichstag.
[24] The conference was passionate and argumentative as representatives tried to decide which great power – Russia or Germany – should be relied on in hopes for future independence.
[26] One unifying point was the stance against the Central Committee for the Relief of War Victims in Lithuania,[25] chaired by Bronisław Piłsudski and established at the end of 1915 together with pro-Polish landowners.
[32] The Germans also allowed three Lithuanian representatives (Antanas Smetona, Steponas Kairys, Jurgis Šaulys; Antanas Žmuidzinavičius was initially selected instead of Smetona)[33] to attend, who brought a memorandum, signed by twelve Lithuanian activists, addressed to Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States.
[25] The memorandum asked Germans to ease their control of life in Lithuania (censure of letters, travel restrictions, monitoring of activities of various societies) and liberalize education (allow Lithuanians establish their own schools and select teachers).
The council delegated Konstantinas Olšauskas and Juozas Purickis, who had to travel to Lithuania with fake passports, to the conference in Stockholm in October 1917.
[38] The primary goal of this conference was to obtain approval of Lithuanians in Russia and United States for the new Council of Lithuania thus preventing competing claims of representing the nation.
[9] The conference in Bern in November 1917 was attended by members of the Council of Lithuania (Antanas Smetona, Steponas Kairys, Jurgis Šaulys, Alfonsas Petrulis, and Justinas Staugaitis) as well as Swiss Lithuanians (Vincas Bartuška, Vladas Daumantas, Juozas Purickis, Konstantinas Olšauskas, Juozas Gabrys, Antanas Steponaitis).
[43] Conference's proceedings are primarily known from an English-language booklet published by Jonas Šliūpas in which he reprinted conference's resolution with a seven-point demand list to Russia and Germany to recognize independent Lithuania, repay war damages, withdraw their armies, include Lithuanian representatives in any peace negotiations.
[45] Instead of increased coordination of efforts, a major ideological dispute further fragmented the Lithuanian independence movement and caused further confusion among foreigners when it aired in the Swiss newspaper Der Bund.
[46] Members of the Council maintained that the conference was only an advisory body, while Lithuanian émigrés, particularly Gabrys, wanted to establish an equal or a superior authority in the west.
Lithuanians living abroad wanted to minimize any ties with Germany that was losing the war and instead rely on the Entente Powers that would decide the fate of Europe in a future peace conference.
