It was "envisioned to be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals",[1] although their ability to perform these missions in practice has been called into question.

Possessing lower air defense and surface warfare capabilities than destroyers, the LCS emphasizes speed, flexible mission modules, and a shallow draft.

Following the decision to arm the LCS with anti-ship missiles, Navy wargames showed the adversary's risk calculus was radically changed, devoting more reconnaissance assets to trying to locate the smaller ships and sustaining heavier losses.

[52] The Navy chose to integrate the millimeter wave radar-guided AGM-114L Hellfire missile to increase the LCS's standoff firepower and defense against swarming fast attack craft.

[44] A longer-range missile with an over-the-horizon (OTH) engagement capability was planned to defend against fast attack craft, ships, and patrol boats by 2020 as part of the surface warfare package Increment 4.

The NSM has a range of 100 nmi (120 mi; 190 km), greater than the Harpoon anti-ship missile, but LCSs lack long-range fire control systems to detect targets at this distance.

[62] In January 2020, the Navy reported that Lockheed Martin's 150 kW High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) would be put on USS Little Rock (LCS-9) for her upcoming deployment.

[72] A wargame held by the Naval War College demonstrated the possibility of using the LCS in open water operations to assist carrier strike groups and guided-missile destroyers.

[83] In the late 1990s, the U.S. Navy realized its Cold War-era cruisers and destroyers had been designed for open-ocean warfare and would be vulnerable in shallow coastal waters, where they would face dangers from high-speed boats, missile-firing fast-attack craft, small submarines, sea mines, and land and air-launched anti-ship missiles.

Two Navy strategists, retired Captain Wayne Hughes and Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, refined an opposing Streetfighter concept for a 1,000-ton small, specialized, and heavily armed vessel costing just $90 million (2001 dollars).

When it was decided the ship would not be expendable, the original concept of a small, cheap, simple coastal warship became bigger, more expensive, and more complicated, with a smaller crew due to automation.

The new design was assigned six different missions which had been previously performed by individual ships: submarine and mine hunting; combating small boats; intelligence gathering; transporting special forces; and counter-drug and piracy patrols.

In June 2009, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, USN testified in a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting that the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and Avenger-class minesweepers were too worn out to cover the gap if the LCS suffered further delays.

[101] Retired Admiral James Lyons, USN called for a $220 million common design with the U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC) program to save costs and meet "limited warfare requirements".

[103] In May 2012, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems released a study that showed seven LCS can more efficiently perform anti-piracy patrols in the Western Indian Ocean than a fleet of 20 conventional ships for a quarter of the cost.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus pointed out that new vessels traditionally start off costing more to operate because of difficulties with building and testing ships simultaneously; GAO reports of new warships since the 1960s support this claim.

[120] In December 2010, the Government Accountability Office identified some problems with the designs including extremely long crew training time, unrealistic maintenance plans, and the lack of comprehensive risk assessment.

[127] The handoff from General Dynamics to Austal of management for the Independence class led to a 13-month schedule slip as the company struggled with building the JHSV ships at the same facilities.

[130] A 2012 report by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez, USN, found that the ships lacked the manpower and firepower to complete the missions required by regional combatant commanders.

[134] In 2013, Captain Kenneth Coleman, the U.S. Navy's requirements officer for the program, identified the LCS as being especially vulnerable to tactical aircraft armed with standoff anti-ship missiles.

[135] Vice Admiral Thomas H. Copeman III is reported to be considering an upsized "Super" LCS,[136] with space to install needed firepower, because he noted that the 57 mm main gun was more suitable to a patrol boat than a frigate.

[143] At a hearing on 25 July 2013, the House Armed Services Committee's seapower subcommittee argued with Vice Admiral Richard W. Hunt on how the LCS would be employed if tensions with North Korea or China led to a confrontation in the Western Pacific.

[145] Other observers suggest that the ships' lifecycle costs and resilience challenges result from the optimal-manning concept, which increases the Navy's dependence on contractors and diminishes opportunities to monitor and repair engineering systems during operations.

[144] A Government Accountability Office report in April 2014 found that several U.S. 7th Fleet officials thought the LCS was more useful in the Persian Gulf, but not suitable in the Pacific theater as they lacked the speed, range, and electronic warfare capabilities.

Navy leaders contend that the LCS's shallow draft is well suited for Pacific operations due to the many shallow-water ports, typically difficult for larger warships to access.

Austal USA submitted a modified Independence-class ship, replacing the LCS' mission modules with permanent systems like a towed array sonar, torpedoes, vertical launch anti-submarine rockets, and aviation capability to support MH-60 helicopters.

[153] Results from the Navy task force on LCS upgrades, capabilities, costs, and alternative options were completed by 31 July 2014 for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to review.

[166] On 14 December 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the Navy to reduce the planned procurement of LCS and FF ships from 52 to 40, and down-select to one variant by FY 2019.

The intent of this cut was to reallocate funds to other priorities, including buying more F-35C Lightning II and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, and SM-6 missiles, accelerating Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer DDG-51 acquisition, and expanding development of the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) for the Block V Virginia-class submarine.

[176] On 22 May 2017, as part of an arms deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the acquisition of four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) ships based on the Freedom-class LCS was announced.