The group's officially designated purpose, is the defense of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS).

[37] The group's officially designated purpose, according to the Iranian government and affiliated news sources, is the defense of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, the granddaughter of Muhammad, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS).

[44] These numbers are likely to increase as the Iranian government continues to identify the remains of Fatemiyoun members, sometimes as long as 5 years after their death, and return their bodies to Iran.

[3] In the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, Liwa Fatemiyoun reportedly began to produce masks and gloves in Iran and Syria, intending to distribute them to poor Syrians.

Researcher Phillip Smyth argued that Liwa Fatemiyoun was supposed to act as Iran's "phantom force" of trained foreign soldiers, ready to be used for possible future interventions.

Accordingly, Symth and ex-Herat Province governor Abdul Qayoum Rahim claimed in 2020 that Liwa Fatemiyoun had begun deployment to other localities around the Middle East without providing firm evidence.

[15] Symth and Rahim also claimed that the constant fighting had turned Liwa Fatemiyoun into an elite force, as most of its less capable fighters had been killed or demobilized, leaving only the most experienced and radical ones.

Other security analysts argued that there was no evidence for further mass foreign deployments, and that Liwa Fatemiyoun was overall diminishing in numbers and suffering from low morale, as the Iranian government had proven to be slow in granting promised benefits to its fighters.

Most importantly, fighters struggled to secure the promised benefits such as salaries, housing, and jobs due to Iran's difficult economic situation and cases of Iranian officials stalling in regards to payouts.

[3] As the unit is often used in those war zones where the most intense fighting takes place[3] despite its sometimes inadequate training,[5] observers believe that Liwa Fatemiyoun fighters often act as "cannon fodder".

[3] According to researcher Phillip Smyth, Liwa Fatemiyoun and Hezbollah Afghanistan were originally different groups, but showed such great overlap in ideology and membership by 2014 that they had become "incorporated".

[4] In contrast, researcher Oved Lobel continued to regard Liwa Fatemiyoun and Hezbollah Afghanistan as separate organizations in 2018, though both were part of Iran's "regional proxy network".

[55] According to then Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, the designation of the Fatemiyoun as a terrorist organization was part of an "ongoing pressure campaign to shut down the illicit networks the [Iranian] regime uses to export terrorism and unrest across the globe.”[56]