The Logical Investigations influenced philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Emil Lask, and contributed to the development of phenomenology, continental philosophy, and structuralism.

[6][7][8][9] Husserl commented in Ideas that the Logical Investigations had led to phenomenology being mistakenly viewed as a branch of empirical psychology, despite his protests, in the article "Philosophy as Strict Science", that this was a misunderstanding of his work.

According to Melle, Husserl believed that commentators had wrongly associated his idea of ontology with Meinong's theory of objects, and that Wundt had put forward an unfounded interpretation and critique of the Logical Investigations.

[13] Heidegger studied them while a student at the Collegium Borromaeum, a theological seminary in Freiburg, where they were so rarely requested from the university library that he was easily able to renew them.

[14] Heidegger was disappointed to find that they did not help to clarify the multiple meanings of being, but was nevertheless impressed by them and convinced to study philosophy as a result of reading them.

[16] In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger credited the Logical Investigations with making the work possible,[17] and noted their influence on the philosopher Emil Lask.

[21] It has also been suggested that the Logical Investigations dealt with questions concerning the role of language similar to those discussed in the theologian Saint Augustine's Confessions.

[26] Soldati criticized the laws Husserl formulated concerning "the relations between dependent and independent parts of a whole", finding them "incomplete and not always easy to grasp."

[27] Noé argued that Husserl modified his views after the publication of the Logical Investigations, expressing a different perspective in his posthumous work The Origin of Geometry.

[29] Alweiss argued that, contrary to a consensus among analytic philosophers, examination of the Logical Investigations shows that Husserl was not a "methodological solipsist".

[31][32] Varga discussed the philosopher Leonard Nelson's criticism of Husserl's arguments against psychologism in the Logical Investigations in Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem (1908), noting that Nelson charged Husserl with "mistaking deduction for proof" and thereby falsely assuming that a psychological foundation of logic would inevitably lead to a vicious circle.

"[31] Criticizing the view that Lask's interest in the work represented his departure from neo-Kantianism, Ainbinder argued that Lask found insights in it that could contribute to making sense of the "Kantian transcendental project" through a "proper understanding of the Copernican Turn in objectivistic terms"; according to Ainbinder, these included the "secondary place of judgment in the constitution of the categorial" and "the idea of a formal ontology".

Revista de Filosofía,[35] John Scanlon in the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology,[36] John J. Drummond in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies,[37] Victor Biceaga in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences,[38] Richard Tieszen in Philosophia Mathematica,[39] Mariano Crespo in Revista de Filosofía,[40] Juan Sebastián Ballén Rodríguez in Universitas Philosophica,[41] Witold Płotka in Coactivity / Santalka,[42] Manuel Gustavo Isaac in History & Philosophy of Logic,[43] Mikhail A. Belousov in Russian Studies in Philosophy,[44] Victor Madalosso and Yuri José in Intuitio,[45] Findlay in The Philosophical Forum,[46] and Andrea Marchesi in Grazer Philosophische Studien.

[48][49] Münch described the Logical Investigations as a "highly theoretical book", finding it similar in this respect to the Critique of Pure Reason.

He wrote that by 1925 Husserl had developed a more satisfying perspective on the issues discussed in the work, including recognition that numbers are formed actively in counting and propositions in judging, the "kernel of truth in psychologism".

However, he added that, in works such as Ideas, Husserl reformulated "the distinction between phenomenological and intentional contents" and developed an improved understanding of "the proper object of philosophical reflection".

[44] Madalosso and José argued that the book contained "various conceptual and terminological problems", including that of how "a psychic act, ideal meaning and real object achieves to establish a correspondence relation".

[45] Findlay argued that in Ideas, Husserl attempted to disguise changes that had occurred in his opinions by attributing his views as of 1913 to the earlier Logical Investigations.

[46] Marchesi argued that while it is widely accepted that "Husserl developed his most sophisticated theory of intentionality" in the Logical Investigations, it had incorrectly been interpreted as non-relational by most commentators.

[49] The philosopher Jacques Derrida, who studied the Logical Investigations as a student in the 1950s,[50] offered a critique of Husserl's work in Speech and Phenomena (1967).

[53] The philosopher Paul Ricœur credited Husserl, along with Frege, with helping to establish the dichotomy "between Sinn or sense and Vorstellung or representation".

[55] The philosopher Roger Scruton has criticized the Logical Investigations for their obscurity;[56] however, he has also described them as being of "great interest", and noted that, alongside Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology (1913) and Cartesian Meditations (1929), they were among the writings by Husserl that had attracted the most attention.

[59] Donn Welton stated that in the Logical Investigations, Husserl introduced a novel conception of the relationships between language and experience, meaning and reference, and subject and object, and by his work on theories dealing with meaning, truth, the subject, and the object, helped create phenomenology, a new form of philosophy that went beyond psychologism, formalism, realism, idealism, objectivism and subjectivism, and made twentieth century continental philosophy possible.

However, he criticized the first edition of the Logical Investigations for sharply distinguishing between "the thing as given to us" and the thing-in-itself, a standpoint he considered comparable to Kant's.