[13][14] In the 1920s and 1930s, airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell[a] claimed that air forces could win wars, obviating the need for land and sea combat.

[24] Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment.

When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all.

German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender.

[54] Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under the pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis".

[67] Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but the period of heaviest bombing had passed before they were finished.

An American witness wrote, "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its beginning".

Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse.

[80] The Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence (WVS) was established in 1938 by the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, who considered it the female branch of the ARP.

[86] Although night air defence was causing greater concern before the war, it was not at the forefront of RAF planning after 1935, when funds were directed into the new ground-based radar day fighter interception system.

[88] Dowding accepted that as AOC, he was responsible for the day and night defence of Britain but seemed reluctant to act quickly and his critics in the Air Staff felt that this was due to his stubborn nature.

The details of the conversation were passed to an RAF Air Staff technical advisor, Dr. R. V. Jones, who started a search which discovered that Luftwaffe Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices.

[48] Up to nine special transmitters directed their signals at the beams in a manner that subtly widened their paths, making it harder for bomber crews to locate targets; confidence in the device was diminished by the time the Luftwaffe was ready to conduct big raids.

Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege.

The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids.

[116] In the initial operations against London, it did appear as if rail targets and the bridges over the Thames had been singled out: Victoria Station was hit by four bombs and suffered extensive damage.

[133] On 19 November 1940 the RAF night fighter ace John Cunningham shot down a Ju 88 bomber using aircraft interception radar, just as Dowding had predicted.

[155] Even so, the decision by the OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine.

First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led the OKL to adopt the naval option.

They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives.

[150] A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941.

The Luftwaffe dropped around 40,000 long tons (40,600 t) of bombs during the Blitz, which disrupted production and transport, reduced food supplies, and shook British morale.

The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil, but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable.

[2] The British began to assess the impact of the Blitz in August 1941 and the RAF Air Staff used the German experience to improve Bomber Command's offensives.

So worried were the government over the sudden campaign of leaflets and posters distributed by the Communist Party in Coventry and London, that the police were sent to seize their production facilities.

The Communists attempted to blame the damage and casualties of the Coventry raid on the rich factory owners, big business and landowning interests and called for a negotiated peace.

Overall, the novel's strength lies in its ability to transport readers to a specific time and place and make them feel the weight of historical events on the characters' lives.

These collections include period interviews with civilians, servicemen, aircrew, politicians and Civil Defence personnel, as well as Blitz actuality recordings, news bulletins and public information broadcasts.

Notable interviews include Thomas Alderson, the first recipient of the George Cross, John Cormack, who survived eight days trapped beneath rubble on Clydeside, and Herbert Morrison's famous "Britain shall not burn" appeal for more fireguards in December 1940.