Detachments of Afghan mujahideen from the Lor Koh region carried out regular attacks on the highway and methodically increased their territory under their control.
Various attempts were made by the command of the Soviet troops and the Afghan army to squeeze the rebel groups out of the gorge and leave the area.
In 1980, the command of the Soviet 5th Infantry Division decided to eliminate the rebel detachment in the gorge and seize the Lor Koh base area.
According to General B.V. Gromov, the commander of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan, the capture of the Lor Koh base was, first of all, needed by the Government forces of the DRA, and not by the 40th Army of the USSR.
At the stage of the beginning of the military operation, it was proposed to mine all the entrances and exits to the gorge, enclosing the rebels in a so-called bag, and keeping them in the zone of constant destruction of Soviet artillery and aviation.
The command of the Afghan army had a different opinion: they offered to make a powerful breakthrough deep into the gorge and destroy the base, while sending Soviet troops forward.
From the very beginning, the course of the operation to capture Lor Koh took on a complex character - attempts to advance into the depths of the mountain range met with fierce resistance from the rebels.
The base was equipped and replenished with reserves in advance and with a prospect for the future: huge stocks of ammunition and food allowed the rebels to hold out for a long time.
To capture Lor Koh, first of all, it was necessary to clear all the approaches to the base and suppress the firing points that targeted the sections of the gorge.
The advance along the mountain ranges in the direction of the base area, for the consistent capture of the dominant heights, was prevented by the oncoming heavy enemy fire.
The forces of Soviet artillery were not enough for preliminary processing by strikes on the slopes in order to exclude the loss of foot groups.
At the initial stage of the war, the Soviet troops were not yet equipped with aviation systems with radio repeaters, those that later hung in the air during each of the hostilities.
Based on this, it was decided not to carry out an operation inside Lor Koh, but to limit itself only to the selected measures: the approaches to the mountain range were mined, the gorges were treated with artillery.
The base area was almost daily subjected to bomb-assault and long-range artillery strikes, mining of the main gorges and approaches to them was constantly repeated.
The Soviet command was oppressed by the fact that during the incessant raids of the rebels, outposts, guard posts and military garrisons - parts of the 40th Army and government troops, continued to suffer losses.
The Soviet paratroopers could not move along the mountain ranges in order to occupy the dominant heights - they ran into a wall of heavy oncoming fire.
The command of the 5th Infantry Division again faced the need to eliminate the rebel detachments and capture the base area of Lurkokh.
At the Lor Koh base, plots of cultivated land were discovered where everything from vegetables to wheat was grown; training fields, where fire training classes were held from various types of weapons from small arms to grenade launchers; classes in tactics, sapper business - the installation and removal of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, land mines, charges.