Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1994–2002)
The start of the period 1994 to 2002 of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in northern Uganda saw the conflict intensifying due to Sudanese support to the rebels.
However, two weeks after Museveni delivered his ultimatum of 6 February 1994, LRA fighters were reported to have crossed the northern border and established bases in southern Sudan with the approval of the Khartoum government.
[1] The end of the Bigombe peace initiatives marks a fundamental shift in the character of the Lord's Resistance Army, which is estimated to have consisted of 3,000 to 4,000 combatants at this time.
Sudanese aid was a response to Ugandan support for the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) fighting in the civil war in the south of the country.
Prior to this support, the LRA could be treated as a minor irritant in the outskirts of the country; now it also had to be considered a proxy force of the Khartoum government.
[3] Not only was a safe haven granted from which the LRA could launch attacks into Uganda, but Sudan also gave a large amount of arms, ammunition, land mines and other supplies.
Mutilations such as those carried out in the wake of the Arrow Group strategy became commonplace, and 1994 saw the first mass forced abduction of children and young people.
The strategy of forced recruitment was prompted by the lack of new volunteers to continue the conflict, and the fact that the young could be indoctrinated to support the LRA much more easily than adults.
On August 31, 1995, thirteen civilians, some with their hands tied behind their backs, were killed in a government gunship attack on an LRA column near Lokung, northwest Kitgum.
They were the leaders of a local initiative to restart the peace talks that had collapsed in February 1994 and had the approval of the President of Uganda and an invitation from the LRA.
A strategy of resettlement, or "villagization", is a common anti-insurgent technique, used extensively for example by the United States throughout the Indian Wars to isolate Native Americans in reservations.
The moral ambiguity of this situation, in which abducted young rebels are both the victims and perpetrators of brutal acts, is vital in understanding the current conflict.
In response the continued insurgencies by the LRA, as well as other pro-Sudanese rebel factions, the Ugandan government aided "Operation Thunderbolt" in early 1997, a large-scale offensive by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
The Ugandan government hoped that it could weaken its enemies by supporting Operation Thunderbolt with tanks, artillery, other ground forces, and supplies.
[13] Though Operation Thunderbolt did not make a tangible impact on the LRA itself, it greatly weakened other Ugandan insurgent factions as well as the Sudanese government.
This also was prompted by the leadership of new President Omar al-Bashir, who wanted to ensure export of the oil from the newly developed fields being wrested from SPLA control.
The Uganda People's Defense Force – the renamed NRA – created a demilitarized zone for the talks, a measure that had the implicit approval of President Museveni.
The NIF government was anxious to avoid any blame that may be attached to them for their offering of sanctuary to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden for several years in the 1990s.
