[3] SOG's first commander, Colonel Clyde Russell, had difficulty creating an organization to fulfill his mission since, at the time, United States Special Forces were unprepared doctrinally or organizationally to carry it out.
[5] The contribution of the South Vietnamese came in the form of SOG's counterpart organization (which used a plethora of titles, and was finally called the Strategic Technical Directorate [STD]).
On the night of 4 August, after being joined by the destroyer USS Turner Joy, Maddox reported to Washington that both ships were under attack by unknown vessels, assumed to be North Vietnamese.
[9] The South Vietnamese crews and personnel on the island posed as members of a dissident northern communist group known as the Sacred Sword of the Patriot League (SSPL), which opposed the takeover of the Hanoi regime by politicians who supported the People's Republic of China (PRC).
[11] MACV had sought authority for the launching of such missions (Operation Shining Brass) since 1964 in an attempt to put boots on the ground in a reconnaissance role to observe, first hand, the enemy logistical system known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the Truong Son Road to the North Vietnamese).
Ambassador Sullivan had the task of juggling the bolstering of the inept Lao government and military, the CIA and its clandestine army, the USAF and its bombing campaign, and now the incursions of the U.S.-led reconnaissance teams of SOG.
The teams, usually three Americans and three to 12 indigenous mercenaries, were launched from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in the border areas (originally at Kham Duc, Kontum, and Khe Sanh).
During 1966 and 1967, it became obvious to MACV that the North Vietnamese were using neutral Cambodia as a part of their logistical system, funneling men and supplies to the southernmost seat of battle.
Although the extension of Laotian Highway 110 into Cambodia in the tri-border region was an improvement to its logistical system, North Vietnam was now unloading communist-flagged transports in the port of Sihanoukville and trucking the cargo to its base areas on the eastern border.
Teams also received rewards including free R&R trips to Taiwan or Thailand aboard a SOG C-130 Blackbird, a $100 bonus for each American, and a new Seiko watch and cash to each indigenous member.
The 5th SF had gone so far as to create Projects B-56 Sigma and B-50 Omega, units based on SOG's Shining Brass organization, which had been conducting in-country recon efforts on behalf of the field forces, awaiting authorization to begin the Cambodian operations.
The JPRC was to collect and coordinate information on POWs, escapees, and evadees, to launch missions to free U.S. and allied prisoners, and to conduct post-search and rescue (SAR) operations when all other efforts had failed.
Another source of aerial support came from the CH-3 Jolly Green Giant helicopters of D-Flight, 20th Special Operations Squadron (20th SOS) (callsign Pony Express), which had arrived at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Navy Base during the year.
When helicopter operations were finally authorized for Daniel Boone, they were provided by the dedicated support of the Huey gunships and transports of the 20th SOS (callsign Green Hornets).
By 1967, MACV-SOG had also been given the mission of supporting the new Muscle Shoals portion of the electronic and physical barrier system under construction along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in I Corps.
One of the survivors, Sergeant first class Charles Wilklow was dragged into a clearing covered by PAVN machine guns to be used as bait to attract a U.S. rescue mission.
Although the Tet Offensive was contained and rolled back, and significant casualties were inflicted upon the enemy, the mood of the American people and government had turned irrevocably against an open-ended commitment by the United States.
The unit was more concerned over Washington's continuous rejection of one of the original goals of the operation: the formation of a resistance movement by potential dissident elements in North Vietnam.
Some American writers on the subject (including many ex-SOG personnel) blamed the failure of the operations on the penetration of the unit by enemy spies – a claim not entirely unsupported by facts.
On the night of 22–23 August as part of the Phase III Offensive a company from the VC R20 Battalion and a sapper platoon infiltrated MACV-SOG's Forward Operating Base 4, a compound just south of Marble Mountain Air Facility, killing 17 Special Forces soldiers (their largest one-day loss of the war) and wounding another 125 Allied troops.
[38] The mission of the Ground Studies Group was to support the sensor-driven Operation Commando Hunt, which saw the rapid expansion of the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Intelligence for the campaign was supplied by both the recon teams of MACV-SOG and by the strings of air-dropped electronic sensors of Operation Igloo White (the successor to Muscle Shoals), controlled from Nakhon Phanom.
Soon, however, an early warning system was created by placing radio-equipped air watch units within the flight paths between the launch sites and Base Areas.
[43] With intelligence on communist Base Areas in eastern Cambodia gleaned from MACV-SOG, huge stockpiles of PAVN arms, ammunition, and supplies were overrun and captured.
As a result of U.S. political reaction, on 29 December the Cooper-Church Amendment was passed by Congress, prohibiting participation by U.S. ground forces in any future operations in either Cambodia or Laos.
[45] Although unknown to the U.S. public, many MACV-SOG veterans participated in Operation Ivory Coast, the Son Tay POW camp raid carried out in North Vietnam on 21 November 1970.
As a test of Vietnamization, Washington decided to allow the South Vietnamese to launch Operation Lam Son 719, the long-sought incursion into Laos whose aim would be the cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
MACV and the South Vietnamese had been planning just such an operation as far back as August 1964, but the concept was continuously turned down due to the fallout that would have been incurred by the invasion of supposedly "neutral" Laos.
[citation needed] On 8 February, 16,000 (later 20,000) South Vietnamese troops, backed by U.S. helicopter and air support, rolled into Laos along Route 9 and headed for the PAVN logistical hub at Tchepone.
[58] Historians interested in the unit's activities had to wait until the early 1990s, when MACV-SOG's Annexes to the annual MACV Command Histories and a Pentagon documentation study of the organization were declassified for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs' hearings on the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue.