MF Global provided exchange-traded derivatives, such as futures and options as well as over-the-counter products such as contracts for difference (CFDs), foreign exchange and spread betting.

A series of perceived liquidity problems and large fines and penalties dogged MF Global starting in 2008, and led to its bankruptcy in 2011.

[4][5] In January 2013, a judge approved a settlement that would return 93 percent of customers' investments, with the prospect of additional payouts from the company's general estate.

[6][7] In December 2014, MF Global Holdings settled a U.S. government lawsuit, agreeing to pay $1.2 billion in restitution and a $100 million fine for customer losses tied to the company's 2011 collapse.

Man Financial embarked on a series of acquisitions, which expanded its product capability and geographic reach, starting in 1989 with the purchase of the Chicago-based GNP Commodities, and including well-known industry names such as Geldermann, Tullett & Tokyo Futures, First American Discount Corp., Australia's Ord Minnett and GNI.

However, in 2005 Man Financial made its largest deal with the transformative $323 million acquisition of client assets and accounts from entities of Refco, following the U.S. financial-services group's collapse in late 2005.

The Refco deal followed a hotly contested auction with Cerberus Capital, the private equity group, and boosted Man Financial's scale in retail and institutional business.

[17] The CME,[18] ICE,[19] Nymex[20] and CFTC[21] issued statements confirming MF Global was in compliance with regulatory and financial requirements.

On Sunday, October 30, 2011, a unit of the New York-based brokerage first reported to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) a "material shortfall" of hundreds of millions of dollars in segregated customer funds.

[27][28][29] The brokerage used a large number of complex and controversial repurchase agreements or "repos" for funding and for leveraging profit, many off their balance sheet.

[30][31] Some of these complex repos have been described as a wrong-way $6.3 billion bet MF Global made on its own behalf on bonds of some of Europe's most indebted nations.

[32][33] The sudden disappearance of so much liquidity may indicate a scandal and crisis related to the widespread practice among US and UK brokers of rehypothecation of customer collateral.

[34] On October 25, 2011, MF Global reported a $191.6 million quarterly loss as a result of trading on European government bonds.

[citation needed] It was stopped from doing new business with the New York Fed until it showed it was able to fulfill its responsibilities as a primary dealer, according to a statement on the regulator's website.

The Wall Street Journal reported that MF Global would seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after investing more than $6.3 billion in sovereign bonds issued by European countries.

Many took its collapse as a reminder that whatever the root causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, some of the primary problems remain because of the lack of needed regulatory changes.

[41] At the time of its bankruptcy filing, MF's board of directors included:[45] In the immediate wake of the bankruptcy, Corzine[46][47] and the board[48] were criticized in the financial press for their apparent non-awareness of the company's condition in the immediate lead-up to the event and their apparent inabilities to manage the risk the company had assumed.

[53][54] U.S. regulators subpoenaed MF Global's auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, for information on the segregation of assets belonging to clients trading on U.S. commodity exchanges.

[55] The bankruptcy trustees office charged with liquidating MF Global fired 1,066 employees of the broker-dealer subsidiary on November 11, 2011.

The shortfall in client accounts at MF Global Holdings Ltd was thought to be around $1.2 billion as of late November 2011, according to the trustee liquidating the company.

[58] With, among other sources of cash, Corzine and other former MF Global executives in 2016 reaching a $132 million settlement with a trustee liquidating the company on behalf of creditors and, in 2015, executives having reached a $64.5 million settlement of separate investor litigation, portions of which were covered by insurance, all customers (as of 2014) and other claims on MF were settled.

[59][60] Some prominent financial industry executives, journalists, regulators, politicians - and some MF Global clients - lay the blame for the demise squarely, and primarily, at Corzine's feet.

On the day of MF Global's bankruptcy, a Bloomberg reporter wrote "Jon Corzine's risk appetite helped destroy his firm.

[64] The New York Times reported as of December 2011 "investigators are now examining whether MF Global was getting away with such illicit transfers as early as August ... a revelation that would point to wrongdoing even before the firm was struggling to survive.

Bloomberg reported that "Barry Zubrow, JPMorgan's chief risk officer, called Corzine to seek assurances that the funds belonged to MF Global and not customers.

JPMorgan drafted a letter to be signed by [Edith] O'Brien to ensure that MF Global was complying with rules requiring customers' collateral to be segregated.

"[69] On March 28, 2012, O'Brien invoked her Fifth-Amendment right against self-incrimination at a Congressional hearing and declined to testify about the missing funds, or any other matter related to MF Global's bankruptcy.