[2][3] His father, Mujaddid Ahmed Ijaz (June 12, 1937— July 9, 1992), was a Pakistani experimental physicist and professor of physics at Virginia Tech[4] who was noted for his early role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear energy program and his discovery of numerous isotopes while working at Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
[12] In the early 2000s, Crescent transitioned from a traditional hedge-fund management firm to a focus on venture investments, initially in homeland security technologies after the September 11 attacks.
[16] Crescent's venture investments included a bid together with its Abu Dhabi affiliate, Al Manhal International Group LLC, to acquire a stake in Formula One team Lotus F1.
[31] Ijaz also used his fundraising results to advance his causes in Congress, appearing as an expert witness in front of committees in the Senate on extremist threats faced by the United States [32][33] and in the House of Representatives to advocate for Washington to adopt a policy of "constructive engagement" with rogue Muslim countries affected by U.S.
[30] In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Ijaz had a public falling out with senior Clinton-era officials, including the former president, Sandy Berger and Susan Rice, over what he deemed were failures in their counterterrorism policies during Clinton's two terms in office.
[43] Ijaz and his wife Valérie also serve as goodwill ambassadors for a British charity, Children of Peace, that works to reconcile differences between Palestinian and Israeli youth.
In noting his belief that governments have often failed to provide assistance to the poor in sufficient ways over the long term, Ijaz sought similar pledges for the proposed fund from other philanthropists.
[47] In May 1996, bin Laden left Sudan for Afghanistan under pressure from the United States when the meetings failed to reconcile U.S. demands made of Khartoum about its record in aiding, abetting and harboring known terrorist groups and individuals.
[8] Ijaz first met Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir and other Sudanese leaders in August 1996 and reported his findings back to U.S. government officials, including Lee Hamilton, ranking member of the House Committee on International Relations at the time, and Sandy Berger, then Clinton's deputy national security adviser, and Susan Rice, then director for African Affairs at the National Security Council.
[48] Initially, Khartoum sought U.S. sanctions relief, particularly for its growing oil sector, in return for access to its intelligence data on Al Qaeda's nascent network and bin Laden's activities there.
[50] Ijaz then argued that Washington should adopt a policy of "constructive engagement" with Khartoum vis-a-vis economic development and political reconciliation in return for Sudanese counterterrorism cooperation.
[34] In April 1997, Omar al-Bashir sent a letter to Hamilton, hand-carried by Ijaz from Khartoum to Washington, D.C., in which Sudan made an unconditional offer of counterterrorism assistance to the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies.
[34] Madeleine Albright, then newly appointed secretary of state, decided to test the Sudanese government's moderating public stance, and on September 28, 1997, she announced that certain U.S. diplomats would return to Khartoum to pursue, among other objectives, obtaining Sudan's counterterrorism data.
Ambassador to Sudan Tim Carney and Ijaz, Susan Rice, then newly appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke persuaded Berger to overrule Albright's overture to Khartoum.
Khartoum's offer included detailed intelligence about the growing militancy of Hezbollah, Hamas, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Iran's Revolutionary Guard, among other groups operating in the region.
[36] Any evidence of bin Laden's involvement in criminal activity against U.S. interests, such as training militia members who attacked U.S. troops in 1993, could have been grounds for indicting him far before Sudan expelled the Saudi fugitive in May 1996.
The plan drafted by Sahay and Ijaz[61] reportedly became the basis of a decision by India's prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to announce a unilateral ceasefire in Indian-held Kashmir in November 2000.
[62] To broaden support for the plan, Ijaz met with senior Indian government officials in New Delhi and leaders of Kashmiri resistance groups in Srinagar.
[59] A resulting peace summit between India and Pakistan, held in Agra in June 2001, sought to forge an agreement on a permanent resolution to the Kashmir conflict, but Musharraf and Vajpayee ultimately failed to persuade their hardliners to allow signing of an accord.
[69] His and other petitions lodged with the Supreme Court alleged that the memorandum had been drafted by Haqqani at the behest of Pakistan's then-president, Asif Ali Zardari, and delivered without knowledge of the country's powerful armed forces and intelligence services.
Pakistan's army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani submitted written testimony to the Supreme Court, as did then-Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani on behalf of the Zardari government.