Older destroyers, primarily the Wickes and Clemson classes, continued to use the Mark 8, as did PT boats early in World War II.

[3] Surface-combatant torpedo attacks very often included confusing splashes from gunnery and aerial bombs, obscuring smoke screens, and quick maneuvering to evade counterattack.

[3] The final straw for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (CINCPOA) to begin to resolve this problem that other admirals and torpedo manufacturers kept claiming was not a design problem but due to the performance of the submariners and surface ships' crew was when a submarine fleet successfully infiltrated Tokyo Harbor on 11 June 1943 but not a single torpedo that was launched by them hit any Japanese ships.

The issues with the Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes were not completely fixed until November 1943 when Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid (Seventh Fleet, SWPA) overruled Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie, who refused to believe that his torpedoes had malfunctions, and ordered all submarine and destroyer captains to disable their faulty magnetic detonators and also the contact pin problem was finally resolved that same month.

Recognition improved at that distance, but torpedo hit probability increased as evasive maneuvering of the large, compact force was restricted within the closer screen.

[6] United States Navy War Instructions (FTP 143) published in 1934 remained in effect through the initial 1942 engagements in the Solomon Islands.