Matanikau Offensive

[7] Because of the threat by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island.

The Japanese warships, mainly light cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to CAF air attack.

These high speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.

[16] Sumiyoshi's forces, including two battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Nomasu Nakaguma, launched attacks on the U.S. Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matanikau on the evening of 23 October.

U.S. Marine artillery, cannon, and small arms fire repulsed the assaults and killed many of the attacking Japanese soldiers while suffering only light casualties.

[17] Beginning on 24 October and continuing over two consecutive nights, Maruyama's forces conducted numerous, unsuccessful frontal assaults on the southern portion of the U.S. Lunga perimeter.

About half of Maruyama's survivors were ordered to retreat back to the area west of the Matanikau River while the rest, the 230th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Toshinari Shoji, was told to head for Koli Point, east of the Lunga perimeter.

[19] In order to exploit the recent victory, Vandegrift planned another offensive west of the Matanikau which would have two objectives: to drive the Japanese beyond artillery range of Henderson Field and to cut off the retreat of Maruyama's men towards the village of Kokumbona, location of the 17th Army's headquarters.

At 06:30, nine Marine and U.S. Army artillery batteries (about 36 guns) and U.S. warships San Francisco, Helena, and Sterett opened fire on the west bank of the Matanikau, and U.S. aircraft, including 19 B-17 heavy bombers, dropped bombs in the same area.

[23] The 2/5 and the Whaling Group encountered very little resistance and reached and occupied several ridges south of Point Cruz by early afternoon.

In several hours of fighting, Company C, 1/5 suffered heavy casualties, including the loss of three officers, and was driven back toward the Matanikau by Tamura's troops.

They ordered 1/5 and 3/5 to continue to press the Japanese along the coast the next day while 2/5 wheeled north to envelop their adversaries west and south of Point Cruz.

[26] On the morning of 2 November, with the Whaling Group covering their flank, the men of 2/5 marched north and reached the coast west of Point Cruz, completing the encirclement of the Japanese defenders.

The Japanese defenses were centered in a draw between a coastal trail and a beach just west of Point Cruz and included coral, earth, and log bunkers as well as caves and foxholes.

Between 08:00 and 12:00, five Marine companies from 2/5 and 3/5, using small arms, mortars, demolition charges, and direct and indirect artillery fire, completed the destruction of the Japanese pocket near Point Cruz.

Marine participant Richard A. Nash described the battle: A jeep wheeled up towing a 37-mm anti-tank gun and Captain Andrews of D Company put a crew of men to setting the thing up to fire into the palm grove.

In despair, Nakaguma discussed taking the regimental colors and seeking death in a final charge at the U.S. forces, but he was dissuaded by other officers on the 17th Army's staff.

[32] Early on 3 November, Marine units near Koli Point, east of the Lunga Perimeter, engaged 300 fresh Japanese troops that had just been landed by a Tokyo Express mission of five destroyers.

[34] After chasing away the Japanese forces at Koli Point, the U.S. renewed the western offensive towards Kokumbona on 10 November with three battalions under the overall command of U.S. Marine Colonel John M. Arthur.

[35] Vandegrift ordered the withdrawal because of the receipt of intelligence from coastwatchers, aerial reconnaissance, and radio intercepts that a major Japanese reinforcement effort was imminent.

[36] The Americans recrossed the Matanikau and attacked westward again beginning on 18 November but made slow progress against determined resistance from Japanese forces.

Map of Guadalcanal and nearby islands. The Matanikau/Point Cruz and Lunga Point areas are in the northwest (upper left) of the island.
Dead soldiers from the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment lie piled in a ravine after being killed by mortar and small arms fire from U.S. Marines on 9 October 1942 [ 12 ]
Map of the battle, 23–26 October. Sumiyoshi forces attack in the west at the Matanikau (left) while Maruyama's 2nd division attacks the Lunga perimeter from the south (right)
U.S. Marine Colonel Merritt Edson (left), photographed near the mouth of the Matanikau a few days before the November offensive [ 20 ]
Map of the U.S. Matanikau offensive
The Point Cruz area on Guadalcanal looking south. The pocket of Japanese resistance was located at the base of Point Cruz in the lower center of the picture
Two U.S. Marines check a Japanese coral block bunker near Point Cruz after the battle on 3 November [ 31 ]
U.S. Marines drag the bodies of dead Japanese soldiers from their bunker in the Point Cruz area after the battle in early November.