Mateo González Manrique
Manrique was a commissioned officer of the Spanish army, starting his career in 1765 with the regimiento de infantería Saboya, rising to the Field ranks of teniente coronel capitán in 1799, and then Sargento mayor in August 1803.
[4] By 1812 the war against Napoleon and the revolts in South America had resulted in the Spanish position on the Gulf Coast deteriorating to a point of total weakness.
[5] Luis de Onís objected to any efforts to defend Florida, either by Spanish action or by alliances with the Indians, or even with British military help.
[7] After their departure, Manrique came to the same conclusion as his predecessor, the Americans would attack Pensacola in the very near future, and Indian support represented the only plausible Spanish defense.
[10] Manrique informed his superiors of the intention of McQueen and the Red Sticks to broaden the war against the Americans, seeking approval to arm the Indians.
[13] After the Battle of Burnt Corn, U.S. Secretary of War John Armstrong notified General Thomas Pinckney, Commander of the 6th Military District, that the U.S. was prepared to take action against the Creek Confederacy.
[a] Jackson's plan was to move south, build roads, destroy Upper Creek towns, and then later proceed to Mobile to stage an attack on Spanish-held Pensacola.
When Jackson began his advance, the Tennessee River was low, making it difficult to move supplies, and there was little forage for his horses.
He was critical that Baratarian pirates led by Jean Lafitte were undertaking their operations from American soil, and had not been apprehended by the authorities, resulting in losses to Spanish citizens.
[28] This was a radical change from the existing policy of holding small populated enclaves with the meager garrison, and avoiding confrontation with either the Americans or the British.
[29] It has been theorized that Manrique was anticipating a substantial British force would be deployed to the Gulf Coast, to which Woodbine and Nicolls were a prelude.
[32] In his letter dated August 24, Jackson criticized Manrique for allowing British agents to operate in Pensacola[33] and warned him that he would consider him personally responsible for any depredations suffered by American citizens.
[34] At Bermuda, on July 4, 1814, Carron and Hermes embarked a company-strength force of Royal Marines, commanded by Edward Nicolls, for deployment on the Gulf Coast.
An anonymous letter sent from Havana, authored by American merchant and vice-consul Vincent Gray,[36] which found its way into the hands of the Governor of Louisiana William C. C. Claiborne,[22] mentioned that permission to land in Pensacola had been denied to the British.
The "numerous British and Spanish squadron of ships and vessels of war" he described comprised two sixth-rates and two sloops of the Royal Navy (Hermes, Carron, Sophie, Childers),[43] the "good train of artillery" comprised three cannon and twelve gunners, whilst the "battalion" was a company-strength group of 100 Royal Marines infantry, detached from Major George Lewis's battalion.
The looting of the Forbes Company store at Bon Secour was another manifestation that the rights of property ownership of Spanish nationals were not being upheld.
In this power struggle, the British threatened to withdraw their forces unless both the harbor and Fort San Carlos were placed under the joint control of Nicolls and Manrique.
Protesting his neutrality, Manrique retorted that it was not in the power of the Governor to declare war, as Gordon wryly noted in his correspondence with Cochrane.
[51][52][53] In a letter to Manrique dated September 9, Jackson expressed his consternation that the British flag was flown at Pensacola when Florida was 'under the most strict plea of neutrality'.
That night, under cover of darkness, Jackson then sent a second messenger, this time a recently captured Spanish Non-commissioned officer of the Pensacola garrison.
A subsequent communication from Jackson protested against his officer being fired upon, whilst carrying a flag of truce, and requesting acceptance of the ultimatum to be received by 6am on November 7.
Under the terms of the surrender, Jackson's troops would occupy the fort until such time as a relieving force dispatched from Spain were to arrive, thereby denying the British from further violating the neutrality of the Spanish.
Jackson's letter to Manrique dated November 9 expresses his disappointment that the British blew up Fort San Carlos, in breach of what was promised, and as such he was no longer prepared to aid him with protecting Spanish neutrality with American troops.
Acknowledging that his attack was 'Not having the Sanction of my Government,' he decided against neither repairing Fort San Miguel, nor occupying it with an American garrison, but to withdraw his troops in order to protect the frontier.
[64] Whilst in Pensacola, Jackson received confirmation a week later of a British task force in Jamaica, destined for New Orleans, so he marched to Mobile,[65][66] arriving there on November 19.
Upon leaving Fort San Carlos on November 9, Nicolls took with him a large proportion of the Spanish garrison, 363 embarked supernumeraries, including 56 Pardos from Cuba,[70] who did not return to Pensacola until 1815.
On January 12, a dejected Urcullo, accompanied by only ten slaves, returned back to Pensacola to inform the governor that his mission had failed.
[f] [g][71] Regarding the runaway Spanish slaves, he wrote a covering letter to Cochrane on March 9, attached to 'a representation from the Inhabitants of Pensacola respecting their losses'.
He told them that new orders meant they could no longer be transported to British territory, and warned them that he foresaw future vengeful behavior on the part of the Americans.
To facilitate a more cordial relationship with the Spanish, the recent issues of slave insurrection were portrayed as attributable to perfidious British influences during the War of 1812.
