Maurice Debate

A senior British Army officer, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, alleged that the War Cabinet had misled Parliament about troop strengths on the Western Front.

[1] Prime Minister David Lloyd George and those close to him had long grown exasperated by the unreliable statistics produced by the Army about both British and German strength.

Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey had written in his diary (20 December 1917) "The War office figures and statements are utterly unreliable, and their facts are twisted to support their arguments.

[3] Shortly after Robertson's removal, the German Spring Offensive of 21 March 1918 came close to inflicting catastrophic defeat on Hubert Gough's Fifth Army.

[5] On 18 April a Liberal backbencher asked whether Lloyd George's figures included non-combatants (e.g. labourers, many of them Indian, Chinese or black South Africans, who built roads and railways and helped to move heavy equipment).

Law replied somewhat disingenuously (see below) that Haig and Philippe Pétain (French Commander-in-Chief) had agreed the extension of the British sector to Barisis between themselves, rather than being leant on by the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

"[3] There is, however, little evidence to confirm Lloyd George's suspicions of a wider plot involving senior military and political figures, to bring down the government.

[11] However, Hankey later told Liddell Hart in 1932 that he had a friendly conversation with Maurice on the eve of his press letter, telling him that Lloyd George thought highly of him and suggesting a number of suitable jobs for him; Grigg speculates that the conversation might have been at Wilson's behest after Maurice's letter to Wilson, and that the staff post in France (which he had declined on 15 April) might have been one of the mooted jobs.

Robertson wrote to him on 4 May, writing that not too much credence should be given to imminent predictions of Lloyd George's downfall, that Maurice should take especial care to get his facts exactly right, and adding: "You are contemplating a great thing – to your undying credit".

[18] In his letter, Maurice wrote that ministers in the coalition government of Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Unionist Party leader Bonar Law, had given false information to Parliament about the strength of British troops on the Western Front to cover up the fact that the number of British troops there had been reduced following Lloyd George's decision (against military advice) to send additional forces to Palestine.

[20] As Thomas Jones put it, Maurice challenged: statements ... made by Lloyd George in the House of Commons on 9 April: first, that notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917, the army in France was considerably stronger on 1 January 1918 than on 1 January 1917, and second, that in Egypt and Palestine there was a very small proportion of British as compared with Indian troops; and by Bonar Law on 23 April that the extension of the British Front which took place before the battle of 21 March was an arrangement made solely by the military authorities.

[21]The government's statements indicated that the British forces on the Western Front were adequate, and therefore implied that the near-defeat inflicted by Germany in March was the responsibility of General Headquarters.

[23] Asquith tabled a private notice question and Bonar Law, on behalf of the government, offered to establish a Court of Honour consisting of two judges to look into the matter.

[13] On 8 May 1918 Howell Arthur Gwynne, editor of The Morning Post, wrote to Asquith admitting that he was a long-standing political enemy of his, but that it was in the national interest that he be restored as Prime Minister in Lloyd George's place.

[24] The letter provoked serious concern in the press both on the substantive issue of the right levels of manpower on the Western Front and their adequate support and because of the allegation that MPs had been misled.

Grigg argues that Maurice claimed to be acting for the sake of Army morale, yet his actions were likely to worsen it by sowing discord, and that it is more plausible that he was hoping to bring down the government.

[26] As with the Fall of Robertson earlier in the year, Asquith's vanity and resentment at having been deposed as Prime Minister (by Lloyd George, in December 1916) made it impossible for him to stay entirely aloof, especially with his wife and his political associates egging him on.

[28] On the morning of 9 May The Times carried a report of a speech by G. H. Roberts, Minister of Labour, complaining of constant "sniping" at the government, a phrase which Lloyd George would use in his peroration.

He treated the issue as if it were a vote of confidence in the government and rebutted Maurice's charges in a powerful, if misleading speech, based on doubtful material.

[38] Lloyd George also reminded MPs that the debate might bring down the Government and restore Asquith as Prime Minister, urging them to "Make no mistake!

[46] Bonar Law said on 23 April that the extension of the British line had already been agreed between Haig and Pétain and, in response to a supplementary question from William Pringle, MP for Penistone, declared somewhat ambiguously that "this particular matter" had not been discussed at Versailles.

In the event, Pétain did not press the matter and Barisis remained the rightward point of the BEF positions at the time of the German attack on 21 March 1918.

[48] Whilst Lloyd George was writing his memoirs in the 1930s, his secretary (and mistress) Frances Stevenson made a diary entry which later came to light when Lord Beaverbrook published Men and Power in 1956.

[49][50] Frances (the widowed Countess Lloyd-George as she was by then) wrote to The Spectator (23 November 1956) stating that the incident had in fact occurred some time after the Maurice Debate.

On 12 May a two-page editorial in The Observer (written by the editor JL Garvin at the behest of the owner Waldorf Astor) denounced him and his reputation never fully recovered.

[56] In the summer of 1918 there were talks between Lloyd George's Chief Whip, Freddie Guest and the Conservatives prepared to guarantee Coalition backing for 150 Liberal MPs in the next general election.

At Newcastle on 29 October 1918, with the general election imminent, Lloyd George claimed that the Maurice Debate had determined which of the 159 Liberals received coalition "coupons", but research has shown that this was not strictly true.

[59] The Maurice debate may not have been the sole identifying factor for those Liberals granted or denied the coupon but the personal rift between Lloyd George and Asquith was deepened by it.