Mass media in Moldova

Television, magazines, and newspapers are all operated by both state-owned and for-profit corporations which depend on advertising, subscription, and other sales-related revenues.

Only few media outlets were able to preserve their independence, due to the "lack of democratic traditions, insufficient financial resources, scarce management and marketing skills, and self-censorship".

The same article (32.3) outlaws the “defamation of the state and the nation, the encouragement to war of aggression, to nationalistic, racial or religious hatred, incitement to discrimination, territorial separatism, public violence, as well as other manifestations that attempt at the legality of the constitutional regime”.

The Criminal Code (Article 347) punishes with up to 3 years in prison the “profanation of the flag, coat of arms, or anthem of the Republic of Moldova or of any other state”, though this has been criticised as inconsistent with international standards.

16 of the Civil Code guarantees the right to respect, honour, dignity and professional reputation, and provides for the refutation of untruthful information and payment of moral and material compensations.

As a result, authorities have in some cases claimed outrageous amounts in compensation from journalists as a way to influence the media and foster self-censorship.

A positive step was made in October 2014 when authorities cancelled fees to access information about companies registered in Moldova.

In the April 2009 Moldovan parliamentary election protests (the “Twitter revolution”) the Communist government has been accused of limiting or blocking access to media outlets, to prevent further mobilisation of the population.

[9] Moldova (including Transnistria) hosted up to 410 media outlets in 2010, half of which established after 2000 - a relatively high number when compared to a small market.

Other principal periodicals include Basarabia (also published by the Writers' Union), Chipăruş, Alunelul, Femeia Moldovei, Lanterna Magică, Moldova, Noi, and SudEst.

Other minority-language periodicals include Prosvita and Homin in Ukrainian, Ana sözu and Cîrlangaci in Gagauz, Rodno slovo in Bulgarian, and Undzer kol/Nash golos in Yiddish and Russian.

EuroCable remained the dominant cable television provider until in the mid '90s it was bought by SunCommunications which merged it with its own service and re-branded it into SunTV.

During the 2000s many other Chişinău based cable television providers such as Satellit, Delta and Alfa emerged offering similar services as SunTV.

Until recently accessing television was only possible via cable but in 2011 StarNet and Moldtelecom launched their separate IPTV services in Chişinău and other towns offering multiple channels on both SD and HD qualities.

[18] In the vigil of the 2014 Moldovan parliamentary election, most private channels aligned with specific political interests, favouring different candidates and parties.

[18] TRM is financed from the state budget and regulated under Moldova's Broadcasting Code by a Supervisory Board, ensuring that its activities serve the public interest.

At the time of the appeal (2002), TRM was the only channel with national coverage, and was particularly relevant for rural population without access to alternative sources of information (cable or satellite TV).

Because Moldova is a small country, telecommunications companies managed to achieve good coverage in both wired and wireless communications infrastructure.

[24] News agencies operating in the separatist region of Transnistria include Ольвия-Пресс (Olvia-Press) founded in 1992; Новый Регион-Приднестровье (New Region - Transnistria), part of the Russian Agency Новый Регион; and Лента ПМР (Lenta PMR)[24] The Union of Journalists of Moldova, founded in 1957 as a creative organisation, was re-organised in 1998 into a journalistic union.

The amendments was drafted by the Independent Journalism Center (IJC) that, together with other civil society organisations, had been advocating for years for enhancing transparency of media ownership.

Specifically, the law requires print media to make public information about the source and value of donations (including non-monetary ones) collected in the country and abroad to be disclosed twice a year and some mandatory data to be published in every issue (title of publication, the founder, the name of the editor, price per copy, address of the editorial office, circulation, number of registration, etc.).

[27] A specific law on transparency of media ownership has not yet be applied even if a draft proposal has been examined by the Parliament in 2014 in more than one reading, before being trapped in parliamentary procedures and being finally stopped as a consequence of political instability.

[36] It provides restrictions for owners and spouses, but according to OSCE expert Katrin Nyman-Metcalf "it may be questioned if not more persons like also children could be covered to avoid it being too easy to circumvent the rules".

[35][38] Disclosures about media ownership, and thus concentration, were made in November 2015, when an amendment to the Broadcasting Code approved in March of the same year came into force.

[35] "In the run-up to local elections in June 2015 (...) most private television channels were aligned with particular parties or interests in their electoral reporting (...); online and print media were found to provide more diverse coverage.

[39] The Moldovan Constitution of 1994 held that: The mass media may not be subject to censorshipSimilarly the Press Law: Any kind of censorship of periodicals and news agencies and interference in their activity related to the preparation and distribution of information is prohibitedAnd also the Broadcast Code: Any censorship of TV and radio communication is prohibitedMoldova is ranked as "partly free" in Freedom House 2016 Freedom of the Press report, with a score of 56,[38] losing one point from the 55 of 2015 (0 is the best, 100 the worst).

The Independent Journalism Centre (IJC) criticised the policy as a violation of access and pressed the government to repeal it, also lamenting the insufficient space devoted to journalists.

[44] All six were either owned or affiliated with Ilan Șhor, a fugitive pro-Russian politician and businessman who fled to Israel in 2019 after being convicted of fraud and money-laundering and sentenced to 15 years in prison in absentia.

[45] In October 2023 Moldova, having declared a national emergency, blocked several websites of major Russian news media organizations, including TASS and Interfax.

[4] To avoid problems, including loss of state funds and lawsuits, media owners or journalist themselves practice self-censorship.