The numbers released by the Central Election Commission were openly contradicted by exit polls and parallel vote tabulations reported by the Georgian media.
In 2009 press freedom was among the top political issues in Georgia, with a battle between government and opposition for control over the public service broadcaster and the denunciation of pro-governmental media outlets, which also included various forms of intimidation of journalists (e.g. pickets and "corridors of shame").
[10] In 2010, the OSCE RFoM intervened to recall Georgian journalists of the professional duties they have committed themselves to, after a controversial fake report by Imedi TV, condemning "irresponsible journalism and the impact it may have on media freedom and security".
Other press outlets include the dailies Alia, Akhali Taoba, Sakartvelos Respublika, Mtavari Gazeti, Versia and Asaval-Dasavali (with different professional standards) as well as the best-seller weekly Kviris Palitra.
[12] Regional print media outlets are mainly weeklies, including Batumi-based Batumelebi, the Kutaisi-based Akhali Gazeti, PS, Guria News, Kakhetis Khma, Spektri and Samkhretis Karibche.
Minority-language newspapers include Russian-language ones (Svobodnaya Gruziya, Golovinski Prospect, Argumenti i Facti), as well as the bilingual Komsomolskaya Pravda v Gruzii and Ajaria.
Titles include Sarke, Tbiliselebi, Gza and Raitingi, as well localised versions of international outlets (such as Cosmopolitan Georgia) as well as Tskheli Shokoladi and Liberal (by M-Publishing).
In 2010, 90% of Imedi was owned by the Georgian Media Holding, a subsidiary of Rakeen Investment, and managed by President Saakashvili's former minister of economy.
Rustavi 2, the most viewed channel, leads in advertising revenues; its airtime is distributed by Media House, which also acts as intermediary for three other Tbilisi-based stations.
In 2014 the Finance Ministry was criticised for requiring the TV audience measurement company TVMR GE to disclose the location of monitored households.
[3] A law in October 2014 required private broadcasters to allot 90 seconds of airtime every three hours for "social advertising" (public service announcements), although the provision was criticised as vague and costly, and giving too wide control powers to the GBCC.
[26] The government has lately tried to attract foreign investments in the film industry by promoting the country as "one of the most film-friendly and competitive production destinations in the world".
[29] The fixed telephony, internet and IP television in Georgia is mainly operated by the Silknet, New Net and MagtiCom controlled 90% of the market in 2018.
Internet penetration in Georgia long remained concentrated in the main towns, due to high prices and lack of landline infrastructure.
Civil.ge, operated by the United Nations Association of Georgia, was launched in 2001 as a multi-language (Georgian, English, Russian) fact-based online newspaper.
They lobby against intimidation and violence against journalists, rejection of public information requests and in favour of legislative changes to serve interests of the regional media.
[9] The Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC), established in 2000 under the 1990 Law on Telecommunications and Post, is and independent government agency tasked with regulating the TLC sector and issuing licenses for radio frequencies through competitive tenders.
[3] The OSCE RFoM called again in 2014 for "full autonomy" to be granted to the GNCC "to ensure the efficiency and impartiality of its work", recalling its importance in the wake of the digitalisation process in order to enhance pluralism in the broadcasting section.
[40] They stated: After electoral turmoil in 2012 and 2013, Georgia has begun to reap the fruits of the reforms undertaken in the recent years, even if political rivalry has sometimes hampered their implementation.
Transparency about media ownership has improved, although news outlets are politically polarized and still not very independent.Legal cases are rarely brought against journalists in Georgia, but legislation often remains unevenly implemented.
[3] In August 2015, the Tbilisi City Court ordered an asset freeze against the main private TV channel, Rustavi 2, pending a civil lawsuit by the businessman Kibar Khalvashi (a supporter of the Georgian Dream party[58]), aiming to recover shares he claims to have been forced to surrender in 2006.
[65] The Georgian Dream government has clarified that it sees the case purely as an ownership dispute and that it will take no part in it, leaving its closure in the hands of the judiciary.
Georgia’s dependence on international connectivity makes it vulnerable to upstream filtering, evident in the March 2008 blocking of YouTube by Türk Telekom.
[68] The Georgian National Communications Commission in general does not much to fight online copyright infringement, and some specific decisions are thought to have been taken for political reasons.
[69] On 27 March 2012, Revaz Sakevarishvili resigned denouncing interference in his work as editor-in-chief of Forbes Georgia by Gagik Eghizaryan, one of the two co-owners of the magazine publishing house.
[74] Indeed, the leading national broadcasters, including the public service ones, were widely perceived as agent of the government disseminating biased pro-governmental information and their actual owners were concealed behind offshore companies.
[74] The amended law contributed to make public the connections of some of the country’s leading media outlets with the government and other political groups and controlled through opaque shell entities.
Specialised terrestrial TV and radio stations, all cable and satellite broadcasters, print and online media are free from these restrictions.
[78][79] However, in 2015 digital terrestrial TV broadcasting was introduced: according to the panelist of IREX Media Sustainability Index the switch run smoothly without political interference.
[94] Some opposition website were founded after United National Movement lost the parliamentary election of 2012, together with non-governmental and civil society organisations that owns them and most of them have direct connections with the members of the UNM.