A dramatic final meeting among first ministers a month before the Accord's constitutionally-mandated ratification deadline seemed to show renewed agreement on a second series of amendments that would address the concerns raised in the intervening debates.
In the 1984 federal election, the Progressive Conservatives, led by Brian Mulroney, committed to eventually allowing the National Assembly to accept the amendments "with honour and enthusiasm," won a majority government.
[3] Bourassa announced that talks could proceed based on the five conditions, adding only the provision that "recognition of Quebec's distinct character" had to be an interpretive clause rather than a symbolic note in a revised preamble.
[4] Believing that a constitutional agreement was possible, Mulroney called a conference with provincial premiers for April 30, 1987 at Willson House, located on the shores of Meech Lake, Quebec, in the Gatineau Hills.
In an open letter published in both the Toronto Star and La Presse on May 27, 1987,[13] Trudeau attacked the Accord as a capitulation to provincialism and the end of any dream of "One Canada".
He referred to Mulroney as a "weakling," the Premiers as "snivelers," and invoked Bourassa's previous reneging of the Victoria Charter as suggesting that the Accord would be the beginning of concessions to Quebec and provincial interests.
Process objections focused on the agreement being negotiated in circumstances considered to be opaque and undemocratic: the amendments were effectively drafted and agreed to by the prime minister and ten premiers themselves in two meetings and were presented to their legislatures as a fait accompli.
Aboriginal, feminist, and minority groups worried that courts could interpret the clause to allow the Quebec government to disregard sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of other constitutional protections in the name of preserving the province's culture.
[30] After the conclusion of public hearings, New Brunswick premier Richard Hatfield was unable to put the Accord to the floor of the provincial legislature, despite significant pressure from Mulroney.
[32] The leader of the opposition, Liberal Sharon Carstairs, was a fervent opponent of the Accord, and believed some dissident PC and NDP members could be convinced to vote it down.
While acknowledging the protection of Quebec's French identity as a pressing and substantial objective, the Court ruled that the outright ban on English-language signs was a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and ordered the language restrictions be struck down.
[38] Bourassa opted to not only use the notwithstanding clause but also propose Bill 178, which continued the ban on outdoor signs, causing four of his English-speaking ministers to resign and sparking general outrage in English Canada.
Wells had campaigned against the Accord, as he was opposed to changing the amending formula before Senate reform, the restrictions on the federal spending power, and felt that Quebec would use the "distinct society" provision to gain special status in Confederation.
Jean Charest, a former federal cabinet minister, was tasked with heading a commission on addressing New Brunswick's concerns on March 22, 1990, which expanded into an attempt to forge an all-party consensus on the Accord.
[45] Despite his opposition, leading Liberal leadership candidate Jean Chrétien, wishing the issue to be off the table, used back channels to pressure Wells to support the agreement.
[47] The two men, who had been close friends since attending law school at Université Laval together, did not speak for several decades afterward, but reconciled shortly before Mulroney's death in 2024.
The combined media presence outside created an atmosphere of chaos and drama, with repeated intonations by Mulroney and other federal officials that acceptance of the Accord was necessary for the very survival of Canada.
[55] At the meeting, Bourassa conceded that a second accord could be adopted that included a guarantee that distinct society would not weaken gender equality and give the territories involvement in the appointment of senators and Supreme Court justices.
[56] The premiers also agreed to hold future conferences on Aboriginal and minority language issues, the creation of a "Canada Clause" to guide judicial decisions in the same manner as "distinct society", a new process for how new provinces would be formed, and a new amending procedure.
After being physically stopped by Alberta Premier Don Getty, he was asked what his conditions were for acceptance, and Wells replied that he needed a guarantee that Senate reform would be carried out.
[58] The next day, another signing ceremony was held, but Wells protested that the draft agreement had deleted a request that a 10-year review be conducted on the distinct society clause without informing him.
When describing the negotiation process to The Globe and Mail, the prime minister stated that he had intentionally scheduled the final conference until the last few days before the amendment could be passed to put pressure on the attendees, which would allow him to "roll the dice" and force the deal to go through.
[64][note 2] Wells had determined that a referendum was impractical in the short time period, and arranged for the Accord to be put to a free vote in the Newfoundland House of Assembly, with himself opposing ratification.
[68] Accordingly, Wells and opposition leader Tom Rideout agreed to cancel the planned free vote in the Newfoundland House of Assembly as unnecessary, believing the likely outcome would have been a rejection.
[66] The federal government had considered asking the Supreme Court to extend the deadline if Manitoba had been the only holdout, but Wells' cancelation of the Newfoundland vote made this effort moot.
[16] In a speech to the National Assembly of Quebec delivered the next day, Bourassa captured the nationalist sentiment of the moment: Le Canada anglais doit comprendre de façon très claire que, quoi qu'on dise et quoi qu'on fasse, le Québec est, aujourd'hui et pour toujours, une société distincte, libre et capable d'assumer son destin et son développement.English Canada must clearly understand that, no matter what is said or done, Quebec is, today and forever, a distinct society, free and able to assume control of its destiny and development.Jacques Parizeau, leader of the opposition, crossed the floor to shake Bourassa's hand and referred to him as "my Premier".
[69] Bourassa, in an attempt to constructively capture nationalist sentiment, declared he would negotiate only with the Federal government, and later passed Bill 150, which promised a referendum by October 26, 1992, on a revised constitutional agreement or sovereignty for Quebec.
[72] Ontario Premier David Peterson had, reluctantly, played a prominent role in creating the accord and continued to support it in the face of growing opposition.
In response to criticism of the Accord, British Columbia and Alberta enacted legislation requiring future constitutional amendments to be put to a referendum before being approved by the legislature.
A variety of constitutional conferences and the efforts of former Prime Minister Joe Clark resulted in the Charlottetown Accord, which contained many of the same proposals, along with concrete involvement of First Nations groups.