Melbourne–Voyager collision
Melbourne, although damaged, suffered no fatalities, and was able to sail to Sydney the next morning with most of the Voyager survivors aboard – the rest had been taken to the naval base HMAS Creswell.
Despite extensive evidence to the contrary, both crews of Melbourne and Voyager were unfairly criticised at this first enquiry and Robertson was posted to a shore base; he resigned soon afterwards.
John Jess (MHR 1960-1972) who was one of the few Parliamentarians to speak out against the injustice of the royal commission described the handling of the enquiry and criticism of both crews as "a tragic situation."
[6][7] Work was suspended at the end of World War II, and did not resume until the Australian government purchased her and sister ship HMAS Sydney in 1947.
[6] The carrier's air group consisted of de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers, Fairey Gannet anti-submarine aircraft, and Westland Wessex helicopters.
[10] The first all-welded ship built in Australia, Voyager was laid down by Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952, and commissioned into the RAN on 12 February 1957.
[10] That evening, while 20 nautical miles (37 km; 23 mi) south-east of Jervis Bay, Melbourne was performing night flying exercises, while Voyager was acting as the carrier's plane guard escort; tasked with rescuing the crew from any aircraft that crashed or ditched.
[12] As aircraft carriers head into the wind to provide maximum assistance for takeoffs, their course can vary widely and on short notice; bridge teams aboard escorting destroyers must thus remain alert at all times.
[21] Recent investigations challenge this opinion by providing direct testimony of the three survivors from "Voyager's" bridge who gave evidence at the first royal commission.
[26][27] Melbourne struck Voyager at 20:56, with the carrier's bow cutting into the forward superstructure of the destroyer just aft of the bridge and operations room.
[30][31] Voyager's forward boiler exploded, briefly starting a fire in the open wreckage of the carrier's bow before it was extinguished by seawater.
[35] At 03:00, after the Voyager survivors were bedded down and the forward collision bulkheads had been inspected and shored up, Robertson handed command of the search operation to Stuart and began to make for Sydney.
[49] Although a naval Board of Inquiry was suggested by senior RAN officers as the best way to investigate the incident, a series of incidents and accidents during the 1950s and early 1960s had left the general public with a mistrust of navy-run investigations, and prime minister Sir Robert Menzies made it clear that an inquiry supervised by a federal judge would be the only acceptable route: anything else would be seen as a cover up.
[50] Regulations for such an externally supervised inquiry were supposed to have been drafted following an explosion aboard HMAS Tarakan in 1950, but they were never enacted, so Menzies' only option was to call for a royal commission.
[64][65] On 18 May 1967, Prime minister Harold Holt announced a second Royal Commission into the Melbourne-Voyager collision, with Sir Stanley Burbury,[note 2] The Hon.
[66] It was the only time in Australian history that two Royal Commissions have been held on the same incident, although it was emphasised that the second enquiry was to focus on Cabban's allegations, not the accident itself.
[68] The commission looked at the proposition that Stevens was unfit for command on the evening of the incident due to illness (a duodenal ulcer), drunkenness or a combination of the two, and that the description of the collision in Spicer's report and the conclusions drawn from it were inconsistent with events.
[76] On condition of anonymity, a doctor informed the first Royal Commission that he had been confidentially prescribing amphetamine to Captain Stevens prior to the collision.
[78] Navy Minister Don Chipp suggested this as an explanation for the contradictory impressions created in the minds of witnesses who reported on Captain Stevens' apparent state of health and demeanour prior to the collision.
[14][80][81] Prior to 2023, and in the immediate aftermath of the collision, five possible causes were put forward:[82] The equipment failure, inadequate training, and miscalculated sea room theories were disproven by the two Royal Commissions, leaving the suggestion that either a communication error aboard one of the ships caused Voyager to manoeuvre in an undesired manner, or the officers aboard Voyager were incorrectly aware of their vessel's position in relation to the much larger aircraft carrier.
[83] The signal was "Foxtrot Corpen 020 22", meaning that Melbourne was about to commence flying operations on a heading of 020°, at a speed of 22 knots (41 km/h; 25 mph), and that Voyager was to[14][80] assume the plane guard station.
[89] However, in his notes written at the commission, Captain Robertson stated there were no witnesses on either ship claiming to see "Voyager" on "Melbourne's" port bow before the collision.
[92] Ferry is also of the opinion that, unless Melbourne was both in Voyager's radar blind spot and obscured by exhaust from the destroyer, it was unlikely that the bridge crew would think they were not to starboard of the carrier.
[71] In 2014 he wrote a summary of the theories, the suitability of Royal Commissions for this type of investigation and related experience from the later HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision.
The treatment of the naval personnel at the first royal commission was described by John Jess, (MHR 1960-1972) as "The greatest injustice carried out in Australian service history.
[38] William Joseph CONDON Electrical Mechanic Warfare was awarded the Albert Medal posthumously, for choosing to stay in the cafeteria and save the lives of young Naval trainee sailors, alongside CPO Rogers, who was unable to escape.
Posthumous Albert Medals for Lifesaving were awarded to Midshipman Kerry Marien and Electrical Mechanic William Condon for their actions in saving other Voyager personnel at the cost of their own lives.
[106] A 1965 High Court ruling prevented armed-forces personnel from suing the government for compensation, although the wife of the dockyard worker killed in the collision was able to make a successful claim.
[107][109] Cases for compensation were lodged by Voyager survivors and their families, and during the 1990s, sailors from Melbourne began to make similar legal claims.
[107][116] Investigations found major accounting issues, including apparent double-charging for work done, and charging full fees after they were discounted or completely written off.
