Military apparatus during the João Goulart government

It is considered the work of the head of the President's Military Cabinet, Argemiro de Assis Brasil [pt], who, however, later denied its existence.

The filling of the high commands with loyal officers was supposed to assure the president's mandate and was considered relevant both within the government and the opposition.

In Brazil, where the presence of officers willing to overthrow the government was continuous,[1] every president needed to set up his military apparatus to secure his mandate.

[4] The favoritism and punishment followed the criteria of the civil authorities, "in disregard of the institution", which became accentuated during the administration of General Henrique Teixeira Lott in the War Ministry and reached a climax in the Goulart government.

[7] The attention given to the military apparatus and the appointment of ruling commanders was visible even in early 1963, with the return to Goulart's full presidential powers.

[10] The device was set up with the Minister of War and the commanders of the First, Second, and Third Armies, reinforced, in the lower ranks, by the support of lieutenants, sergeants, and cabos [pt].

[3] The practices of sending unwanted officers to remote garrisons and passing over their promotions in favor of less qualified but more loyal ones only increased resentment against the government.

[13] Even though there was control over the commands with generals, which was pronounced in Guanabara, lower ranking officers could be drawn into the conspiracy;[14] for then-Colonel Carlos de Meira Mattos [pt], "from Lieutenant colonel on down, everyone was with us".

In March 1964, General Armando de Moraes Ancora commanded there, below Dantas Ribeiro, a supporter of the president, in the First Army, who was "a friend of the minister, a disciplined soldier".

[23] The concentration of the apparatus in Guanabara made it impossible for it to be the starting point for the coup, but it also ended up allowing less reliable officers to take over in other states.

[24] For Navy Captain Ivo Corseuil, head of the Federal Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service [pt] in 1964, this was a mistake, since Kruel was unreliable and had participated in the 1954 Colonels' Manifesto against Goulart.

[26] Corseuil has an identical negative assessment of the appointment of Joaquim Justino Alves Bastos [pt] to the command of the Fourth Army, in Recife.