In the immediate aftermath, Croatian authorities claimed the offensive was not ordered by the General Staff and that the advance was made in response to a series of provocations.
The Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) confiscated Croatia's Territorial Defence Force's (Teritorijalna obrana – TO) weapons to minimize resistance.
[1] On 17 August, the tensions escalated into an open revolt by Croatian Serbs,[2] centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin,[3] parts of the Lika, Kordun, Banovina regions and eastern Croatia.
[7] In early April, the leaders of the Croatian Serb revolt declared their intention to integrate the area under their control, known as SAO Krajina, with Serbia.
[10] On 8 October, Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia,[11] and a month later the ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska – HV).
[18] As a consequence of organisational problems and breaches of ceasefire, the UN peacekeepers, named the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), did not start to deploy until 8 March.
[21] Failure of this aspect of the implementation of the Vance plan made the pink zones a major source of contention for Croatia and the RSK.
[23] The JNA battlegroup, augmented by elements of the 9th Military Police Battalion, deployed at 5:50 a.m. and clashed with the HV force in Nos Kalik.
[25] The HV captured 21 RSK troops in Nos Kalik, intent on exchanging the prisoners for Croats held under arrest in Knin.
[26] Following negotiations, the HV agreed to pull back on 11 April, but later declined to do so, claiming deteriorating security at the battlefield in general prevented the withdrawal.
[30] On 21 June, the HV attacked RSK positions at the Miljevci Plateau, located in the pink zone north of Šibenik.
[31] The artillery fire progressively intensified until 23 June, while the RSK mobilised and counterattacked against the HV positions at the Miljevci Plateau.
On 23 June, a total of 29 RSK soldiers killed at the Miljevci Plateau on the first day of the battle were thrown into the Bačića Pit, contrary to orders given by Brigadier Ivan Bačić, commanding officer of the 113th Infantry Brigade.
[43] According to Croatian sources, the HV also destroyed ten tanks and armoured personnel carriers, and captured six howitzers and a considerable stockpile of other weapons and ammunition in the battle.
[31] Bačić claimed that while no specific order to attack was received, Tus did instruct him to respond aggressively and capture as much territory as possible in cases of grave breaches of ceasefire by the RSK forces.
That was the first such move in twenty years, and a reversal of the official stance towards the offensive which had originally declared it as an unauthorised deployment of the HV.