Minimax Condorcet method

The candidate with the largest (maximum) number of votes in their worst (minimum) matchup is declared the winner.

In each matchup, a candidate's score is equal to the number of voters who support them over their opponent.

Minimax finds each team's (or candidate's) worst game – the one where they received the smallest number of points (votes).

Each team's tournament score is equal to the number of points they got in their worst game.

When winning votes is used, minimax also satisfies the plurality criterion.

[citation needed] With the pairwise opposition variant (sometimes called MMPO), minimax only satisfies the majority-strength Condorcet criterion; a candidate with a relative majority over every other may not be elected.

MMPO is a later-no-harm system and also satisfies sincere favorite criterion.

Nicolaus Tideman modified minimax to only drop edges that create Condorcet cycles, allowing his method to satisfy many of the above properties.

Schulze's method similarly reduces to minimax when there are only three candidates.

Assume three candidates A, B and C and voters with the following preferences: The results would be tabulated as follows: Result: With the winning votes and margins alternatives, the Condorcet winner A is declared Minimax winner.