[7] Vladimir Lenin viewed Poland as a bridge to bring communism to Central and Western Europe, and the Polish–Soviet War seemed the perfect way to test the Red Army's strength.

The Bolshevik's speeches asserted that the revolution was to be carried to western Europe on the bayonets of Russian soldats and that the shortest route to Berlin and Paris lay through Warsaw.

Its capture would have had a major propaganda effect for the Russian Bolsheviks, who expected the fall of the Polish capital not only to undermine the morale of the Poles, but to spark an international series of communist uprisings and clear the way for the Red Army to join the German Revolution.

[11] 3 Fronts (Northern, Central, Southern), 7 Armies, a total of 32 divisions: 46,000 infantry; 2,000 cavalry; 730 machine guns; 192 artillery batteries; and several units of (mostly FT-17) tanks.

Next, Piłsudski's plan called for the 1st and 2nd Armies of General Józef Haller's Central Front (10+1⁄2 divisions) to take a passive role, facing the Soviet main westward thrust and holding their entrenched positions, Warsaw's last line of defence, at all costs.

At the same time, the 5th Army (5+1⁄2 divisions) under General Władysław Sikorski, subordinate to Haller, would defend the northern area near the Modlin Fortress; when it became feasible they were to strike from behind Warsaw, thus cutting off Soviet forces attempting to envelop Warsaw from that direction, and break through the enemy front and fall upon the rear of the Soviet Northwestern Front.

According to the plan, Sikorski's 5th Army and the advancing Assault Group would meet near the East Prussian border, leaving the Soviets trapped in an encirclement.

Criticism was levied on the logistical side, as suggested concentration points were as far as 100 to 150 miles (160 to 240 km) from many Polish units, most of them engaged on the front lines, and all of that a mere week before the planned date of the counterattack.

Piłsudski himself admitted in his memoirs that it was a gamble; he decided to go forward with it due to politicians' defeatist stance, fear for the safety of the capital, and the prevailing feeling that if Warsaw were to fall, all would be lost.

[15] After the battle, many reports suggested that the plan was in fact prepared either by Weygand or by the Polish Chief of Staff Tadeusz Jordan-Rozwadowski.

[19]: 197–198, 222 Mikhail Tukhachevsky planned to cross the Vistula River northwest of Warsaw, around the city of Włocławek, and then attack from that direction to encircle the capital.

[21] According to the historian Thomas Fiddick in 1973, rumors of disobedience to orders on the Soviet side by General Semyon Budyonny, or possibly even Joseph Stalin, were baseless.

It meant it was replacing its goals of Europe-wide Communist revolution with a sort of "peaceful coexistence" with the West amidst internal consolidation.

[22] However, more recent historians have stated that Stalin disobeyed orders in early August 1920 when he attempted to conquer Lvov rather than transfer his troops to assist Tukhachevsky's forces that were attacking Warsaw.

[citation needed] The first phase of the battle started on August 12, with a Red Army frontal assault on the Praga bridgehead.

In heavy fighting, Radzymin changed hands several times and most foreign diplomats left Warsaw; only the British and Vatican ambassadors chose to remain.

The Modlin sector was reinforced with reserves (the Siberian Brigade and General Franciszek Krajowski's fresh 18th Infantry Division, both elite, battle-tested units: the 5th Army held out until dawn.

The struggle for control of Radzymin forced Józef Haller, commander of the Polish Northern Front, to start the 5th Army's counterattack earlier than planned.

[10] At that time, Piłsudski also commented on the dreadful state of logistics of the Polish army: "In the 21st Division, almost half of the soldiers paraded in front of me barefoot."

[10] The 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to reach the village of Izabelin, 13 kilometres northwest of the capital, but this was the closest that Russian forces would come.

Budyonny resented this order, influenced by a grudge between commanding South-Western Front generals Alexander Ilyich Yegorov and Tukhachevsky.

On the first day of the counteroffensive, only one of the five Polish divisions reported any sort of opposition, while the remaining four, supported by a cavalry brigade, managed to advance north 45 kilometres unopposed.

[4][10][33] On August 18, Tukhachevsky, in his headquarters in Minsk, some 300 miles (480 km) east of Warsaw, realized the extent of his defeat, quickly issuing the orders for the Red Army to retreat and regroup.

He wanted to straighten the front line to improve his logistics, regain the initiative and push the Poles back again, but the situation had progressed beyond salvaging.

The division's rapid advance allowed it to intercept the 16th Soviet Army, cutting it off from reinforcements near Białystok and forcing most of its troops to surrender.

[10][33] Although Poland managed to achieve victory and push back the Russians, Piłsudski's plan to outmanoeuvre and surround the Red Army did not succeed completely.

After initial successes, by the end of August, three of them—the 4th, 15th and 16th Armies, as well as the bulk of Bzhishkyan's 3rd Cavalry Corps—had all but disintegrated, their remnants either taken prisoner or briefly interned after crossing the border into German East Prussia.

A National Democrat Sejm deputy, Stanisław Stroński, coined the phrase, "Miracle on the Vistula" (Polish: Cud nad Wisłą), to underline his disapproval of Piłsudski's earlier "Ukrainian adventure".

"[4] Diaries from many participants of the battle attribute the outcome to the Blessed Virgin Mary (citing multiple reasons, including widespread national prayer beforehand and subsequent reports of her appearance on the battlefield).

[37] According to documents found in 2005 at Poland's Central Military Archives, Polish cryptanalysts broke Russian ciphers they had intercepted as early as September 1919.